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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THEORIES OF FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Harassed by local officials and private vigilantes, civil rights workers
in the South have sought federal protection.1 To avoid the charade of
trial in hostile state courts, they have asked federal courts to quash
sham criminal prosecutions.2 To deter violence, they have asked the
Department of Justice for prosecutions under the civil rights statutes
and, in extreme situations, for the presence of enforcement personnel.3
But federal officials have hesitated to disturb the autonomy of local
law enforcement institutions, even where intervention has been neces-
sary to assure the supremacy of federal law.
Behind these inhibitions is a theory of federalism, articulated mainly
by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Harlan, and, most recently, by
former Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall. 4 Though never
1. Popular and official accounts of racial intimidation abound. See, e.g., Uniran STATES
CoAM'N ON CIVI RIGHTs, JusncE (1961); LAw EroRcErAr.'r (1965); Hearings Before the
United States Comm'n on Civil Rights (Jackson, Miss.) (1965) (hereinafter cited as Jus-
TIcE, LAw ENFORCmENT, and Jackson Hearings); THE SouTHERN REGIONAL CouNcIL.,
INTIMIDATION, REPRISAL, AND VIOLENCE (1959), LAw ENFORCEMENT IN 'MIssiPPI (1965).
See also the several essays collected in SorTHERN JusTIcE (Friedman ed. 1965) (hereinafter
cited as SouTERN JusTicE), especially those by Teachout, Burns, and Lusky. For repre-
sentative examples which have come before the courts, see Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380
U.S. 479 (1965); Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1962) (all examples of official intimidation); United States v.
Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966) (private organized violence).
Terrorism was the basic instrument of the South's previously successful effort to drive
the Negro from politics. See Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment )S70-77. 28
J. So. HisT. 202 (1962); V. L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO lIN MIssssIPPI 1865-90. 167-99 (1947).
Since Reconstruction, recurrent violence has operated to reinforce the Negro's sense
of impotence. See M1%RDAL, AN A[EirC.mn DiLEMMtNIA (1944); DOLLARD, CAsTE AND CLASS IN
A Sou-ruN Tow 314-88 (1937).
2. See generally Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L Rrv. 793 (1965); Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law:
a Problem in Nullification, 63 COLUMN. L Rnv. 1163 (1963).
3. See generally Bums, The Federal Government and Civil Rights, in SourTmN JL's-
*rcE 228.
4. The basic texts are: Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138-61 (1945) (Frankfurter.
Jackson, Roberts, JJ., dissenting); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202-59 (1961) (Frank.
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given a full-dress statement, this theory provides the conventional wis-
dom with the notion that federalism is simply a device for "dispersing"
or "diluting" government power.5 From this notion springs fear that
federal activism entails harm to federalism.0
But federalism is a more complex mechanism. It is also designed to
check abuses by dominant local factions, a task assigned to the central
agencies and diverse constituency of the federal government. So under-
stood, the objectives of federalism support intervention in today's deep
South.
furter, J., dissenting); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959) (Harlan, j.); MARSHALL,
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1964) (hereinafter cited as FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS).
5. FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 50; Jackson, Message on the Launching of the Bill
of Rights Review, I BILL OF RIGHTS REVIEW 34, 35-36 (1940).
6. Burke Marshall has provided the most elaborate development of the doctrinal Impli-
cations of die notion that "civil rights issues cut into the fabric of federalism," that they
"cut most deeply where police power is involved." FEDERAuSM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 81. Mar-
shall makes explicit the willingness of proponents of restraint to subordinate the prin-
ciple of federal legal supremacy, and the assumption that federalism compels such sub-
ordination. Youthful civil rights workers, he has said,
cannot understand federal inaction in the face of what they consider, often quite
correctly, as official wholesale local interference with the exercise of federal consti-
tutional rights. Apparently their schools and universities have not taught them much
about the working of the federal system. . . . What is wrong with [their] analysis?
...The question embraces all the deepest complexities of the federal system.
Id. at 49-50.
The assumption that federal action on behalf of civil rights conflicts with the require-
ments of federalism has received more frantic expression at the hands of Professor Kur-
land of Chicago, who mourns "the effective subordination, if not the destruction, of the
federal system." Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, Forward: Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 143, 144 (1964). He sees this catastrophe as a logical corollary of the desegregation
cases, the sit-in cases, and principally the reapportionment cases, Id. at 162-63.
But this notion that civil rights and federalism involve competing values enjoys favor
not only with advocates of restraint. It is reflected in the dich4- with which analysis often
begins in civil rights cases-that the benefits of federal action must be weighed against
danger to the "delicate balance" of federalism. See, e.g., Note, Federal Injunctions and
State Enforcement of Invalid Criminal Statutes, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 647 (1965); Note, The
Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (1953). This notion
derives from the theory best articulated by Frankfurter and Jackson, that the purpose of
federalism is to preserve a balance of political power between the federal and state gov-
ernments. See notes 47-49 infra and accompanying text.
Indeed, even activists accept the formula that demands for intervention present a con-
flict between "federalism" and "individual rights." They argue merely that the latter
value should be preferred to the former. See Sobeloff, Federalism and Civil Liberties:
Can We Have Both? 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 296, 297; Van Alstyne, Book Review, 10 VILL. L.
REy. 203, 208 (1964); Wasserstrom, Book Review, 33 U. CHI. L. RV. 406, 413 (1966).
Wasserstrom is the first writer to suggest that federalism in contemporary jargon may
represent only an "ideology," rather than the only acceptable definition of the term. Id.
at 410.
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I. THE RATIONALE OF RESTRAINT: SEPARATE FUNCrIONS
FOR SEPARATE POLrrICAL SYSTEMS
To justify restraint, contemporary theorists invoke a model of the
federal system shaped by the concept of separation of powers.7 The
federal government is responsible for "national" functions, such as
maintaining a sound economy. State governments are charged with
"local" responsibilities, in particular preserving order through tort and
criminal law. Whenever the federal government takes over local police
powers, federalism is jeopardized.8
A. State Autonomy under the Reconstruction Amendments:
"Under Color of Law" and "Comity"
The fourteenth and fifteenth amendments preclude strict separation
of functions; even if narrowly construed, the amendments require occa-
sional Supreme Court review of state tort and criminal cases. Contem-
porary separate function theorists endorse Supreme Court review under
the amendments. But they preserve state autonomy by distinguishing
Supreme Court review from "direct intervention,"0 which includes all
7. Political scientists are accustomed to applying the phrase "division of powers" to
intergovernmental relations in a federal system. See, e.g., Huntington, The Founding
Fathers and the Division of Powers, in ARnA AND POwan 169 (Maass ed. 1959). However,
in the view articulated by Frankfurter, Jackson, Harlan, and Burke Marshall, it is
separation, rather than division which is stressed. Their point is, not that judicial or
legislative power, for example, is "divided" between state and nation, but that federal
powers (powers being equivalent to "functions') are distinct and separate from state
powers (functions). Justice Frankfurter matched his insistence on separation of state
from federal functions with an analogous and similarly inspired aversion to sharing of
functions among the three branches of the federal government. In both inter- and intra-
governmental relations, separation of powers, rather than checks and balances, was the
guiding principle. See THomAs, Fkim FAN,-uRTEm-ScnoLAR ON TiM BF'UCn, Part Five
passim, especially 265.66, 267, 284-85, 290-91, 315 (1960); Nathanson, Separation of
Powers: The Justice Revisits His Own Casebook, in Fum FRNm'uRunm: Tim JuDGE 1,
28-29 (Mendelsohn ed. 1964). Compare BURNs & PELTAsoN, Govf uim ,xr n- TIMa Pzoptr-
THE DzxomAncs OF AIuCAN NATiONAL Govaumbr."r 64-66 (3d ed. 1957).
8. See the opinions of justice Frankfurter in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 222, 242
(dissenting); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 138-39, 140-46, 148-49, 160-61 (1945) (dissenting with Justices Jackson and Roberts);
Mali-ski v. New York, 324 US. 401, 412-18 (1945). See also Senator Robert F. Kennedy's
introduction to FREaaPNsax AND CaL RIj¢rs xiii- i (1964).
9. The term is the author's, although similar terminology is used in FEamtAUS." AnD
CIVIL RIGHrs at 44, 75. See also Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168-69 (1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 US. 401,
412 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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forms of federal action undertaken before the state has authoritatively
defined its position. Intervention is permissible only if, as in the case
of Supreme Court review, it follows state refusal to honor federal rights.
Until the state's option to afford protection has lapsed, federal insti-
tutions must stand aside.10
Separate function theorists have brought this concept of state au-
tonomy to two doctrinal controversies: (1) the meaning of the phrase
"under color of law," in statutes which prohibit state officials from in-
terfering with civil rights;" and (2) the uses of the principle of comity
in civil rights cases. Originally, "under color of law" was construed to
include any interference with federal rights by a state official.12 Thus
a heavy-handed sheriff might be subject to federal prosecution, even if
he had also violated state law. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson saw
this overlapping federal jurisdiction as a dangerous invasion of state
autonomy. By providing a remedy, they argued, the state had exercised
its option to protect federal rights. Therefore, conduct interfering with
civil rights, if prohibited by state law, was action "in defiance of" rather
than "under color of" law.13
10. To conform to this separate function conception of state autonomy, statutory civil
rights remedies have been construed to allow only post-conviction relief. See notes 28-28
infra.
11. "Under color of law" appears in those statutes which prohibit interference by
local officials with federal rights: 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964); 17 Stat. 18 (1871), 42 U.S.c.
§ 1983 (1964); 16 Stat. 140 (1870), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(b) (1964). The most fre-
quently used of these statutes are 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and its companion 18 U.S.C. § 242,
which provide:
§ 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
§ 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law.
Whoever, under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account
of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are pre-
scribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
12. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 839,
346 (1880). Classic defined the phrase as follows: "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state law." 313 U.S. at 326.
13. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 224-46 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 148 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ., dissenting).
(Vol. 75:10071010
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Frankfurter and Jackson claimed to be faithfully serving the original
intent of the Reconstruction Congress.14 But these prophets of re-
straint, who frequently castigated the Radicals' "vengeful spirit,"15
could not have thought that Thaddeus Stevens shared their scruples
about federal intervention. Frequently, they implied that their narrow
construction set the constitutional limits of congressional power under
the amendments. Conduct which violated state law they considered
"unauthorized" by the state. Hence, it was not "state action," and Con-
gress was powerless to act under the amendments. 10 Only when the
authoritative institutions of the state flouted federal rights, could Con-
gress act:
The commands of the Fourteenth Amendment were addressed
to the States. Only when the States, through their responsible
organs for the formulation and administration of local policy,
sought.., to deprive the individual of a certain minimal fair-
ness in the exercise of the coercive forces of the State, or without
reasonable justification to treat him differently than other persons
subject to their jurisdiction, was an overriding federal sanction
imposed ....
This conception begot the "State action" principle on which,
from the time of The Civil Rights Cases . . . , this Court has
relied in its application of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.' 7
In many cases, Frankfurter and Jackson endorsed far more expan-
sive definitions of state action."' But federal displacement of state police
powers provoked unique concern. At one point, Justice Frankfurter
decided that his antagonism to direct intervention was a matter "ap-
proximating constitutional dimension
14. 365 U.S. at 241; 525 U.S. at 148-49.
15. 825 U.S. at 140-42. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 657 (1951); United States
v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1951). In Collins, Justice Jackson indicated his acquaintance
with one of the major Reconstruction histories, which like virtually all treatments of
the period before the 1950's, was violently hostile to the Radicals. 341 U.S. at 657 n.S.
See STAPP, THE ERA OF RECONSrRUCTON 13 (1965).
16. 325 U.S. at 147-48; 365 U.S. at 237-38. In Screws, other members of the Court noted
the constitutional overtones of Justice Frankfurter's rhetoric:
Lying beneath all the surface arguments is a deeper implication, which compre-
hends them. It goes to federal power. It is that Congress could not in so many 'words
denounce as a federal crime the intentional and wrongful taking of an individual's
life or liberty by a state offidal acting in abuse of his offidal function and applying
to the deed all the power of his office. This is the ultimate purport of the notions
that state action is not involved and that the crime is against the state alone, not
the nation. 825 U.S. at 133.
17. 365 U.S. at 237-38.
18. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama. 326 U.S. 501
(1946).
19. 365 US. at 222. (Emphasis added.)
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More often than not, Supreme Court majorities rejected narrow con-
struction of civil rights statutes.20 Nevertheless, these laws never be-
came the threat to state autonomy which Frankfurter and Jackson
feared, for separate function principles soon captured the Department
of Justice.21 Department officials neglected the civil rights criminal
statutes and refused to send federal enforcement officials to the deep
South.22 Hence the task of applying the Court's relatively broad defi-
nition of federal power fell to private litigants.
But, in administering relief under the civil rights statutes, the courts
kept faith with separate function principles, by broadly interpreting
the principle of comity. Incorporated in several judge-made and statu-
tory rules, comity cautions federal judges to give state courts every
opportunity to reconcile state legislation with the Constitution. For
example, the "abstention" doctrine, born in a Frankfurter opinion for
the Court,23 requires that district courts remand to the state judiciary
constitutional challenges to ambiguous state statutes. This gives the
state court a chance to save the statute through narrow construction.
2 4
Kindred rules forbid injunction of either threatened
2 or pending20
20. In Monroe and Screws, the Court extended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 18 U.S.C. § 242
to all official interference. In Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70 (1941), an evenly di-
vided Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's holding that 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964), was not a
supplementary remedy for official interference with fourteenth and fifteenth amendment
rights. In Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), the Court followed Justice Jackson's
refusal to allow 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), to cover private interference with federal rights not
derived from the Reconstruction amendments. For a recent critique of Collins, see Note,
74 YALE L.J. 1462 (1965). The Court's willingness to go along with Justice Jackson in
Collins appears to have stemmed from an inarticulate and misplaced obsession with the
state action requirement. Cf. 341 U.S. at 663-64 (Burton, J., dissenting).
21. The Justice Department's effort in the 1940's to crack down on Southern racial
violence contrasts sharply with the laissez-faire policy of the Eisenhower and Kennedy
years. See Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil Rights Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REv. 175 (1947); CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEsT FOR A SWORD (1947);
Chafee, Safeguarding Fundamental Human Rights: The Tasks of States and Nation, 27
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 519, 526 (1959). Compare Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 207; Note,
Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297 (1965); Shapiro,
Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 532, 546 (1961).
22. See LAW ENFORCEMENT 142-44; SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
Mississippi 22-25, 33-35 (1965); Burns, The Federal Government and Civil Rights, in
SoUTrERN JusTucE 228, 235 (1965). For an expression of the Justice Department's Ideology
of restraint, see generally FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RICHTS, especially viii-ix, 49-50, 78.81.
23. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
24. 312 U.S. at 499. Other factors reinforce the "forecast, rather than a determination"
theory of abstention. Note, Abstention: an Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv.
226, 228-29 (1959); Note, Abstention and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of
Means and Confusion of Goals," 73 YALE L.J. 850, 850-51 (1964).
25. The ban on injunction of threatened proceedings is of purely judicial origin. Its
most significant contemporary restatement is Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157,
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state proceedings, even though they might jeopardize federal rights.
Comity also accounts for the cold reception given two Reconstruction-
born remedies for unconstitutional prosecutions. To avoid disruption
of state criminal proceedings, a hearing on federal habeas corpus must
await exhaustion of state remedies.27 Similarly, removal under the civil
rights removal statute is limited to cases where a finding of racial bias
is compelled by obviously invalid state statutes. -s
Despite boilerplate about the states' sovereign dignity and the in-
tegrity of local courts, most judges treat rules of comity as instruments
of efficient administration. 29 Abstention is supposed to avoid the crea-
tion of unstable precedents. 30 Noninterference with state criminal pro-
163-64 (1943). See HART & WAcHsL.R, TnE FEDEr. COURTS AND THE FEDERA.L SYsMi- 862-
64 (1953).
26. "Pending" proceedings, defined as proceedings in which state indictments have
already been filed, are protected from federal injunction by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1964). For the history of the anti-injunction statute and of the various liberties taken
by the courts in its construction, see HART & WEcHsLER., op. cit. supra note 25. at 847-48,
1075-78; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HAv. L REv. 345, 349, 367-78
(1930).
27. The Reconstruction addition to federal habeas corpus remedies is now 14 Stat. 385
(1867), 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1964). The exhaustion doctrine was introduced in E-c Parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). Like the rule against injunction of state proceedings, this
judge-made doctrine of comity is now codified. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). See Darr v. Bur-
ford, 393 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1950). Present exhaustion doctrine permits liberal use of habeas
corpus, after state prisoners have exhausted state procedure for judicial review and sought
federal review in the Supreme Court; exhaustion of state habeas corpus and other post-
conviction remedies is not required. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447 (1953), a deci-
sion in which Justice Frankfurter vigorously concurred. See id. at 510. But exhaustion
prevents invocation of federal habeas corpus before the state appellate process has had
its say, and, a fortiori, before the trial itself. For application of the doctrine in civil rights
cases, see Hillegas v. Sams, 349 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 80 Sup. Ct. 927
(1966); Application of Wyckoff, 196 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Miss. 1961). For exhaustive analysis,
see Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Fed-
eral Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L
REV. 793, 882-908 (1965).
28. Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). See
Amsterdam, supra note 27, at 805-18, 842-82. For recent reaffirmations of Rives and Powers
in the context of civil rights controversies, see Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579
(4th Cir. 1964), reaffirmed en banc, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2438 (Jan. 21, 1966).
29. Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392, 397 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381, 3,4-86
(1961); Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120, 123-24 (1951); New York v. Galamison, 342
F.2d 255, 270 (2d Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 1342 (1966). Occasion-
ally, discussions of comity are adorned by elaborate bows to state "sovereignty." See Dom-
browski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 561 (E.D. La. 1964), reo'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Warren,
supra note 26, at S74-75.
30. Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941); Note, 103 U. PA.
L. REv. 226, 227-28 (1959). Critics of abstention have suggested that the doctrine in fact
frustrates efficient administration. See the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in
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ceedings ensures orderly procedures for prosecution, trial, and appeal.,'
But separate function theorists see in comity a vindication of their
concept of state autonomy. In effect, the rules of comity prevent direct
intervention by the judiciary. They keep district courts from directly
participating in the administration of local criminal justice, confining
federal action to review by the Supreme Court. Like the Frankfurter-
Jackson interpretation of "under color of law," comity implements the
notion of the state as an integral institutional system. Federal action
must wait for the state to authoritatively declare its position on a
matter, "so that federal judgment will be based on a complete product
of the state .... enactments as phrased by its legislature and construed
by its highest court ....-
B. Massive Resistance versus Federal Supremacy:
Comity as a Safeguard of State Political Power
Under normal conditions, comity does not impair the enjoyment of
federal rights. State courts are presumed to protect constitutional rights
in good faith.33 Ordinarily, the presumption is justified. If state judges
misapply the Reconstruction amendments in a given case, Supreme
Court review can vindicate the individual complainant.
In the South massive resistance to the civil rights movement dis-
rupted this comfortable pattern. Rules of comity denied effective fed-
eral relief to victims of groundless prosecutions; extraordinary bail
charges and deliberate delays on appeal made Supreme Court review
an expensive, time-consuming, and merely temporary respite from per-
petual harassment.3 1 At the same time, executive policies of deference
to local law enforcement officials left no remedy for police brutality
and private violence.
3 5
Under these novel circumstances, some Southern federal judges and
a minority of the Supreme Court concluded that rebellious state insti-
England v. Louisiana Board of Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 423-37 (1964). See also Wright,
The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 815, 817-18 (1959).
31. See sources cited supra note 29.
32. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 178 (1959). Justice Frankfurter notes the blood
relationship between his construction of "under color of law" in federal civil rights stat-
utes and the separate function analysis of comity in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,
146 (1945) (dissenting opinion). See also Justice Frankfurter's emphasis on local adminis-
tration of criminal justice in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1951).
33. FEDERALISM AND CiviL RIGHTS 55.
34. Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: a Problem in Nullification, 63
COLUm. L. REv. 1163, 1167-77 (1963); SOUTHERN JusricE 255; Amsterdam, supra note 27,
at 794-99.
35. See sources cited in notes 1, 21, and 22 supra.
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tutions were undeserving of comity.30 In their view, massive resistance
contradicted comity's two presumptions. State legislation aimed at "un-
dermining federal law" showed that state institutions would not pro-
tect federal rights in good faith;37 systematic harassment meant that
Supreme Court review would not adequately protect civil rights.38
For the separate function school, however, massive resistance did not
justify relaxing the rules of comity. When the NAACP asked a federal
district court for direct relief from the Virginia statutes designed to
drive it from the state, Justice Harlan ordered the district court to
abstain.3 9 His opinion for the Court ignored the district court's justi-
fication for relief-that Virginia's avowed purpose was to obstruct fed-
eral law.40 The Department of Justice applied its own version of com-
ity, even where state officials acted in bad faith. Although he was sure
of "official wholesale local interference with the exercise of federal
constitutional rights," Burke Marshall believed that it was necessary to
respect comity principles.41 Marshall even maintained that the Presi-
dent was constitutionally bound to accept, prior to the Alabama free-
dom rider's crisis, Governor Patterson's promise to prevent violence.42
The two approaches to comity reflect two distinct theories of the
federal system. For those who think that massive resistance makes com-
ity inappropriate, the organizing principle is federal legal supremacy.
In their view, the supremacy clause requires federal intervention when-
ever the states deliberately violate their federal obligations. Adminis-
trative convenience and respect for local officials give way before the
overriding obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal law.
43
But in the separate function model, federal supremacy is not con-
trolling. Where comity clashes with federal supremacy, the conflict is
resolved in favor of comity.
44
26. Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 184 (1959) (Douglas. J., dissenting); Jordan v.
Hutcheson, 523 F.2d 597, 599-602 (4th Cir. 1963); NAACP v. Patty. 159 F. Supp. 503. 521-
23 (ED. Va. 1958); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 569-70 (E.D. La. 1964) (Wis-
dom, J., dissenting), rev'd, 580 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. 260 U.S. at 184.
38. See notes 1, 21, 22 supra. In his Harrison dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas doubts that
state courts will be reliable under conditions of local antagonism to federal law or a
political minority. 260 U.S. at 180-84.
29. Harrison v. NAACP, supra note 36.
40. See Note, 108 U. PA. L. RFv. 226, 235-36 n.74 (1959).
41. Fn EASISM AND CIvm RIGHrS 49-55.
42. Id. at 58.
43. See Mr. Justice Douglas' Harrison dissent, 360 U.S. at 179-84, and Judge Wisdom's
dissent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. at 570-71.
44. Separate function theorists have seemed not to recognize conflict between defer-
ence to state institutions and federal legal supremacy, although Burke Marshall ap-
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Separate function theorists do not ignore the supremacy clause in
every instance of nullification. They would allow the federal govern-
ment to sweep aside state obstruction of a specific federal court order,
as in Little Rock, where Governor Faubus sent his militia to thwart
a district court's integration decree.4r But what federalism dictates in
Little Rock, it prohibits in Jackson, where police jailed freedom riders
in deliberate violation of rights established by decades of precedent.
40
Except where nullification assumes the form of contempt of court, the
federal government must stay its hand.
Why do separate function theorists treat Jackson so differently from
Little Rock? The distinction they see, like their separation of Supreme
Court review from "direct intervention," reflects a preoccupation with
the political dimension of federal-state relations. Their overriding goal
is to maintain a stable political relationship between the state and
federal governments. To ensure stability, both state and nation must
have sufficient power to guarantee their independence. It is to preserve
this "require[d] . . . balance of political forces" that the federal judi-
ciary and the Justice Department must subordinate federal legal su-
premacy to separate function principles.4 7
This emphasis on the political consequences of federal action ex-
plains the insistence that preservation of domestic order is a local func-
tion. States must retain this prerogative because of the power inherent
proaches explicit recognition of the problem. See FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RinTs 4, 7, 8,
44, 59-60. Justice Frankfurter came dosest to admitting the necessity, under his concep-
tion of comity, of subordinating federal supremacy when the two principles conflict in
Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 91 (1952). See Comment, Extradition Habeas Corpus,
74 YALE L.J. 78, 115 (1964). Failure to recognize particular instances of conflict between
comity and federal supremacy stems from a general disregard for the possibility that state
defiance of federal law can occur in a federal system. Most of what passes for contem-
porary federalism theory simply bypasses the problem of nullification. See the several
essays collected in F-aAuisM: MATURE AND FMERGENT (MvacMahon ed. 1955) discussed In
note 87 infra. Justice Frankfurter in particular was plagued by a vocabulary resistant to
analysis of federal-state conflict. See Henkin, Voice of a Modern Federalism, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 68, 85-86 (Mendelsohn ed. 1964). Thus blinded to the possibility
of federal-state conflict, Frankfurter appeared to regard comity as a device for harmoniz.
ing institutional relationships between state and nation, regardless of whether state insti-
tutions obeyed their federal obligations:
Self limitation is not a matter of technical nicety, nor judicial timidity. It reflects
the recognition that to no small degree the effectiveness of the legal order depends
upon the infrequency with which it solves its problems by resorting to determina-
tions of ultimate power. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 241 (1961).
45. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46. Lusky, supra note 34 at 1169, 1181-83.
47. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 142 (1945) (dissenting opinion); Cf. FEDnRALISa
AND CIVIL RIGHTs 50.
1016 [Vol. 75:1007
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
in administrative control of civil and criminal justice. Thus the kinds
of intervention necessary to enforce federal law in Jackson would
threaten the states' monopoly of administrative responsibility. Federal
authority to abort state criminal prosecutions might make district
courts meddlesome overseers of state trials. Widespread enforcement
of federal criminal legislation might lead to FBI control of local
police forces.4 8 Such threats to state power must be quashed, if the
states are to retain the political independence required by federalism-
an independence confirmed by the South's ability to defy the federal
law of racial equality.
But protecting state administrative power does not bar federal inter-
vention in all cases. Supreme Court review and even military enforce-
ment of a particular court order, as in Little Rock, are tolerable. As
ceremonial functions, these forms of intervention dramatize the fed-
eral obligations of local officials. But however dramatic, Supreme
Court review and military intervention involve only rare and momen-
tary displacements of local authority. Habeas corpus provides a more
immediate potential for interference, but "exhaustion" insures that
habeas corpus will impose no prior restraints on state officials. Thus
limited, federal action will not sap the strength of local institutions
charged with day-to-day administrative responsibility.
These tacit assumptions explain the familiar saw that the four-
teenth amendment worked no basic change in federal-state relations.
4
3
On its face this statement is mystifying, for the amendment reordered
the legal relations between state and nation by imposing federal re-
strictions on every act attributable to a state. But theorists concerned
with political power, rather than abstract legal relations, recognize
that new federal law does not by itself have political impact. In sepa-
rate function theory, the amendments did not change federal-state rela-
tions significantly, because they brought no expansion of federal
administrative power.
II. CONTEmPoRARY THEORY IN HIsToIucAL PERsPEcrvE
Proponents of restraint in the South invoke federalism with a con-
fidence which suggests that their theory is the only model for resolving
48. JACKSON, TAE SUPR-mE COURT IN THE AmERICAN SYSTEmi OF Go..tr,-%r 70-71
(1955).
49. Words to this effect often appeared in the opinions of Justice Frankfurter. See,
e.g., his dissents in Screws, 525 U.S. at 140, and Monroe, 365 U.S. at 237. But they
also slip, unexamined, into the rhetoric of such advocates of active federal protection
of federal rights as Mr. Justice Douglas. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. at 109.
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federal-state conflict. But among historically significant analyses, only
the anti-Federalist theories of Jefferson and Calhoun would bar direct
protection for Southern civil rights activities. Congress and the Supreme
Court have generally preferred the Federalists' theory to the anti-
Federalist notion that state autonomy should be valued above federal
legal supremacy. 50 By introducing the concept of checks and balances,
the Federalists provided for a more flexible distribution of state and
federal power, compatible with forceful action in the service of federal
supremacy.
A. Pre-Civil War Theories: Jefferson and
Calhoun versus the Federalists
After ratification of the Constitution, controversy continued over
the relative scope of state and federal power.5 1 Like current theory,
Thomas Jefferson's analysis of the federal system divided power be-
tween state and nation according to a distinction between local and
national functions.5 2 Jefferson's separation-of-powers approach pre-
cluded intervention to enforce federal law.
5 3
Later John C. Calhoun devised the doctrine of concurrent majorities
to protect geographic minorities from federal power.54 Calhoun be-
lieved that the states had remained "sovereign" after the ratification of
50. The Fugitive Slave cases were the only instances of judicial review of congres-
sional or executive action to deal with problems of nullification. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (17 Pet.) 539, 614-15, 617-18 (1842), discussed in notes 65-66 infra and accompany-
ing text. In all cases where the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the validity
of disobedience to federal court orders, it has responded with resolute affirmation of
federal supremacy. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Where, however,
local antagonism to federal law is resolute, executive action has been necessary to deny
de facto success to nullification. Where such action was forthcoming, federal law was
observed, as in the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania and the South Carolina tariff con.
troversy of 1832. Where enforcement was irresolute, nullification has proved a successful
strategy, as with the Fugitive Slave laws in the pre-Civil War North and the embargo
in New England before the War of 1812. For discussion, see I WARREN, THE Sut-m:E
COURT IN UNITED STATES HIsToRY 387-89 (1922); 2 Id. at 191, 480; Miller & Howell, Inter-
position, Nullification, and the Delicate Division of Power in a Federal System, 5 JOURNAL
OF PUBLIC LAw 2 (1956).
51. See R. G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMtERICAN SUPREE,\ COURT 54-65 (1960).
52. Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Areal Division of Powers, in AREA
AND PowER 150, 169-79 (Maass ed. 1959).
53. 1 Moci, THE PROBLENI OF FEDERALISM 82-83 (1931).
54. The most succinct expression of Calhoun's theory, elaborated in writings and
speeches throughout his career, is found in his DIsQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A Dis-
COURSE ON THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES in 1 TlE WORKS or
JOHN C. CALHOUN (1854). For extensive treatment of Calhoun's theory, see 2 Mooz, op.
cit. supra note 53, at 105-17.
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the Constitution.5 Because sovereignty was "indivisible,"50 a federal
law could not be enforced within the borders of a state where it
had been formally "nullified." Only a constitutional amendment could
force the state to comply.5 7
Contemporary theory differs tangibly from Calhoun's. It limits fed-
eral power by restricting methods of enforcement, instead of denying
the validity of federal law. Its concepts are functional, rather than le-
galistic; it avoids the rhetoric of "sovereignty." But generic similarities
link Calhoun and the separate function theorists. The concept of state
government as an integral decision process is akin to Calhoun's indi-
visible state sovereignty.58 Frankfurter's aversion to "determinations
of ultimate power"59 requires an accommodation to state nullification
which differs chiefly in mechanics and terminology from Calhoun's
"concurrent majorities."00
Jefferson and Calhoun framed their theories in response to the Fed-
eralists' campaign for a strong central governmentl The Federalists
attacked the "idea of an absolute separation and independence" as if
the states and federal governments "belonged to different nations. 6
2
In their view, emphasis on federal supremacy distinguished the federal
plan of the Constitution from that of the Articles of Confederation.
According to Hamilton, national law under the Articles was addressed
to the states alone, whereas the Constitution subjected individuals
directly to federal law and permitted federal action to secure indi-
vidual obedience:
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
Confederation is in the principle of legislation for states or gov-
ernments, in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contra-
distinguished from the individuals of which they consist ....
55. CALHOUN, A DiscouRsE ON THE CoNsTrrtmON AND GovERNl.%'mT OF THIE U:,%ED
STATES, op. cit. supra note 54, at 115-149.
56. Id. at 146.
57. Id. at 277-80, 284-302.
58. See note 9 supra and accompanying text; notes 31-32 supra and accompan)ing text.
59. See notes 43 and 44 supra and accompanying text.
60. In principle, strict obedience to comity and deference to local law enforcement
officials shelters local nullification no less effectively than Calhoun's proposal for formally
ratifying the practice. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text. Had federal judges
and executive officials maintained intact their commitment to separate function prin-
ciples over the past two years, nullification in the South would remain as successful as
it had been from 1877 until 1964. See notes 156-57 and 165-67 infra and accompanying
text.
61. The Federalists' position was set forth systematically in THE FEDERAUsT. especially
numbers 9, 10, 15-20, 27, 32, 39, 47-51.
62. Quoted in Hu,NGToN, supra note 7, at 191.
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The consequence of this is that though in theory federal resolu-
tions . . . are laws constitutionally binding on the members of
the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which
the States observe or disregard at their option ...
If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be exe-
cuted without the intervention of the particular administrations,
there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The
rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitu-
tional right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the pro-
priety of the measures themselves....
The federal government . . . must stand in need of no inter-
mediate legislations, but must itself be empowered to employ the
arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions.03
Following the Federalists' directions, the Constitutional Convention
allowed for federal trial courts, to assure enforcement of locally un-
popular legislation. 4 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story later wrote
Hamilton's connection between federal supremacy and plenary enforce-
ment power into constitutional doctrine. Rejecting a constitutional
attack on fugitive slave criminal legislation, he held in Prigg v. Penn-
sylvania that Congress had implied power to secure enjoyment of any
federal constitutional right, by proscribing any form of interference:
If, indeed, the constitution guarantees the right, and if it re-
quires the delivery upon the claim of the owner ... , the natural
inference is, that the national government is clothed with the ap-
propriate authority and functions to enforce it. The fundamental
principle, applicable to all cases of this sort, would seem to be, that
where the end is required, the means are given .... r
Prigg demonstrated the Supreme Court's commitment to broad federal
jurisdiction under the supremacy clause-in the context, however, of
a Constitution which allowed for little encroachment on state police
power.
B. The Post-War Court, Federal Supremacy, and the
Reconstruction Amendments
The Reconstruction amendments prompted the Court to reconsider
its commitment to federal supremacy theory. If the amendments were
construed to give Congress and the President power to prevent all
forms of interference, public and private, vast changes might occur in
federal-state relations. The vague multitude of rights covered by the
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 89-93 (Modem Library ed. 1937) (Hamilton).
64. Lusky, supra note 34, at 1178-79.
65. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842).
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fourteenth amendment, in particular, could justify federal intrusion
into areas of law and administration which had been governed solely,
and quite adequately, by state law. 0
To avoid this redistribution of police power, the Court in 1873 re-
moved the fourteenth amendment from the reach of Justice Story's
implied power doctrine.6 The amendment, it was reasoned, did not
"create" constitutional rights, since the rights it specified had previ-
ously been granted by state law. Hence they were not federal rights at
all, and Congress had no implied power to enforce the amendment.
As rights "incident" only to "state citizenship," fourteenth amend-
ment rights could be protected only against "state action."' 8
Noting the Court's refusal to imply full enforcement power from the
fourteenth amendment, contemporary opponents of intervention be-
lieve its decisions confirm their own inflexible aversion to federal law
enforcement responsibility.0 9 But they have misconstrued the post-Civil
War Court's doctrine and the theory of federalism it reveals. In fact,
the Court qualified its general preference for local power by approving
federal protection for the Southern Negro.70 It wished to allow the
federal government to suppress racial violence in the South, but not
to intervene elsewhere for other purposes. The Court achieved its com-
peting aims by distinguishing the fourteenth from the fifteenth amend-
ment. Unlike the fourteenth amendment, the fifteenth was held to
"create" a "new" right, the right to vote irrespective of race. Under
the implied power doctrine, the federal government could act against
all forms of interference with Negro voting rights. Thus, in fifteenth
amendment cases the "state action" doctrine was inapposite. Even if
the state allowed Negro voting, the federal government might prevent
private intimidation.71
The fifteenth amendment affected only political warfare between
whites and Negroes. Having thus limited federal power to intervene,
66. The following analysis of the post-Civil War Court's approach to construction of
the Reconstruction amendments is based on the textual interpretation set forth in Note,
The Strange Career of "State Action" under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YsX UJ.
1448, 1449-54 (1965). The Court argued that without the state action requirement, the
due process clause could be turned into an excuse for enacting federal murder and theft
statutes. See Justice Bradley's opinion in United States v. Cruilshanh, quoted in Note,
74 YAIE L.J. at 1452.
67. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 US. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72, 82 (1873). See Note, 74
YALE L.J. at 1451-52 n.21.
68. 74 YAE L.J. at 1452.
69. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 236-37 (1961).
70. See 74 YALE L.J. at 1451-52.
71. Ibid.
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the Court contemplated no limitations on the manner of its exercise.
Since all racial intimidation was in part aimed at driving the Negro
from politics, the fifteenth amendment by itself placed Southern ter-
rorism within reach of Congress and the Attorney General. 2 The Court
recognized that its acceptance of federal supremacy doctrine could jus-
tify federal displacement of local law enforcement:
We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle that the govern-
ment of the United States may, by means of physical force exer-
cised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American
soil the powers to command obedience to its laws and hence the
power to keep the peace to that extent.
7 3
C. Dynamics of the Federalists' Model: Checks and
Balances and the Guarantee Clause
The Court never explained its theory of federalism when endorsing
intervention in the South, and the rationale of its decisions has since
been forgotten. 74 To find theoretical support for the Court's position,
we must return to the Federalists' analysis. In the Federalists' view, it
was unrealistic to confer on any single institution an outright monop-
oly over specified functions. Each institution would inevitably reach
for a share of control over functions legally the sole province of others.
Moreover, striving for an absolute separation of functions was dan-
gerous; it would create pockets of uncontrolled power, susceptible to
abuse. Flexible sharing of functions ensured that the power of one
institution would be "checked and balanced" by the power of others.7
This checks and balances mechanism distinguishes the Federalists'
model of federal-state relations. In the "compound republic" contem-
plated in the Constitution, Madison explained:
... a double security arises to the rights of the people. The dif-
ferent governments will control each other, and at the same time
each will be controlled by itself.76
72. See generally Swinney, Enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, 1870-77, 28 J. So.
HIsT. 202 (1962); Y. L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MIsssSSPPI 167-99 (1947).
73. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395 (1880) (Bradley, J.).
74. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY 56, 81-89 (1960); Grcssman, The Unhappy His-
tory of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 1323, 1336-40 (1952); Frank and Munro,
The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131,
167 (1950). A more sophisticated view sees in these cases an attempt to rationalize the
law with the retreat of the Northern populace and the federal political branches from
their ephemeral commitment to Reconstruction aims. WOODWARD, THE BuRDEN Or SouTH-
ERN HISTORY 84 (1960).
75. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 335-47 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (Madison); Hunting.
ton, supra note 7, at 183, 191-93.
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339 (Modern Library ed. 1937) (Madison).
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In particular, the Federalists favored a protective role for the federal
government; thus, their emphasis on federal legal supremacy. 7
Madison's theory of factions justified this intervention in affairs nor-
mally the business of the states. In the Madisonian state all factions
would participate, none would dominate. For a single faction in com-
mand of the government would inevitably suppress other groups and
destroy individual rights.7" Madison believed that the states were more
likely than the federal government to fall prey to a single oppressive
faction. The states were smaller, contained fewer factions, and hence
were more susceptible to single-interest majorities. In contrast, the
multiplicity of factions across the nation would prevent one from cap-
turing the federal government. Thus, the system's ultimate guarantee
of political liberty was the power of the federal government to prevent
abuse of state power by local majorities. 0
Madison never specified which forms federal intervention should
take. The Federalists may have thought that intervention would nor-
mally include judicial review under the few prohibitions on the states
written into the original Constitution."0 One danger, however, was felt
to warrant explicit constitutional provision. This was the possibility
that factional domination would destroy the republican character of a
state's government. Unless the system could check anti-republican
"usurpations," the people of a captured state would lose their liberty,
and republicanism across the nation would be threatened.81 To coun-
ter this threat, the Federalists wrote into the Constitution the command
of Article IV, Section 4:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican form of Government .... .
They intended this clause to grant the federal government whatever
power was necessary to restore republicanism, or as the concept is now
understood, representative democracy.
83
Although the guarantee clause itself has been forgotten by constitu-
tional history, the model of federalism symbolized by its terms retains
77. See note 63 supra.
78. THE: FEDEPA sT No. 10 (Madison).
79. Huntington, supra note 7, at 189-91.
80. U.S. CON sT. art. I, § 10; art. IV.
81. See Diamond, The Federalist's View of Federalism, in INsTIUnT FOR STUDIES L'
FEDRALisiMi, ESSAYS IN FEDERAUsMi 52 (1961).
82. U.S. CoNST., art. IV, § 4.
83. See THlE IEDEnALimr No. 45 (Madison). "Democracy" in the idiom of the Federalists
denoted government by the people themselves, as distinguished from government through
popularly elected representatives. Tim FEDERALsr No. 10 (Madison).
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its force. There was no occasion for use of the clause before the Civil
War.8 4 After emancipation, federal power was set in motion against the
single glaring challenge to representative democracy in United States--
exclusion of the Negro from the Southern political process. In allow-
ing protection for the Southern Negro, the post-war Court followed the
Madisonian model. The Court's failure specifically to invoke the guar-
antee clause proved not that the clause was irrelevant, but that it was
unnecessary. The Reconstruction amendments, especially the fifteenth,
provided an alternative means of securing the guarantee.8,
III. THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE FEDERALIST MODEL
After 1877, a public tired of Reconstruction allowed violence and
terror to disfranchise the Southern Negro.8 6 For a century, legal and
academic authorities, like nearly everyone else, overlooked the exclu-
sionary character of Southern politics. Basic themes emphasized by
The Federalist were forgotten-that nullification of federal law and
abuse of local governmental power were likely to occur, and that the
central government's power must be sufficiently elastic to prevent such
dangers.8 7 Attention has returned recently to local political abuses, and
84. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitu-
tional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513, 531-40 (1962); Lerche, Congressional Interpreta.
tions of the Guarantee of a Republican Form of Government during Reconstruction, 15
J. So. Hsr. 192, 192-93 (1949).
85. During the Reconstruction period, Congress continually debated the question of
the relation between the Guarantee Clause and the fourteenth and fifteenth amend-
ments. See Lerche, supra note 84, at 198-210. Until ratification of the fifteenth amend-
ment, the Guarantee Clause was used to require of newly admitted states that they deny
no person access to the franchise on grounds of race. See Lerche, The Guarantee of a
Republican Form of Government and the Admission of New Stales, 11 J. POLTCS 578,
589-91 (1949). At the time, the fifteenth amendment alone gave Congress full power to
cope with all forms of racial intimidation. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
86. H. CUMMINGS AND C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUsTrCE 246-49 (1937); WHARTON, op. Cit.
supra note 72, at 193-94; WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEv SourrH 1877-1913 324-25 (1951);
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 52-53 (1957).
87. The tendency has been to consider that American federalism is in a "mature"
stage in the evolution of a principle of harmony. See note 44 supra. At Columbia
University's Bicentennial Conference on federalism in 1954, only Arthur Holcombe con-
tributed a brief essay on the problem of assuring federal supremacy. The Coercion of
States in a Federal System, in FEDERALISM: MATURE AND EMERGENT 137 (McMAIION ed.
1955). Holcombe treats the problem as academic and hypothetical, of no practical con-
sequence for the "mature" federalism of the United States. His discussion of the state
of progress in inducing Southern states to enfranchise Negroes in consonance with the
fifteenth amendment and to give them treatment consistent with the fourteenth amend-
ment is complacent and optimistic, recognizing neither injury to the principle of federal
supremacy, on the one hand, nor of need to employ means other than Supreme Court
review to assure eventual compliance:
What neither the force of arms nor the more subtle coercion of political leaders at
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Congress and the federal courts have rediscovered the Reconstruction
amendments. 88 But expansion of federal safeguards has not dispelled
the notion that federalism erects rigid barriers to interference with
local functions.8 9
Separate function theorists view the problem of intervention as a
conflict between "federalism" and "individual rights." 0 They consider
that federalism is designed only to diffuse power by protecting the in-
stitutional integrity of the states. "Individual rights" is pictured as a
value analytically separate from federalism. Federalism will be served
by federal abstention; individual rights, by remedial action. In every
case, the question is which of these competing considerations should
be favored.91
It is not misleading to describe the interest represented by Clarence
Gideon as "individual rights," and his antagonist as the state, rather
than the instrument of a particular political group. But when South-
ern Negroes and civil rights workers seek relief from intimidation,
this approach misses the point, for what is really involved is an effort
by one faction to exclude another from the political process. The im-
the head of national parties had been able to accomplish, the federal courts are
gradually bringing to pass by the creation of an ever-broadening series of prece-
dents. The episode records the working of an important principle of political science.
When in the fullness of time a political question becomes justiciable, the problem
of coercing states in a federal union loses its importance so far as that particular
question is concerned. Until that time is reached, American experience suggests that
what politicians can not readily achieve by the political techniques of compromise
and pacific adjustment had better be left undone unless the tension of unadjusted
controversy threatens to provoke conflicts fatal to the existence of the federal union
itself.
Id. at 152.
The similarities between Holcombe's prescription and Calhoun's concurrent majority
are not unclear. Compare sources cited in note 44 supra and the essay of John Fischer.
Prerequisites of Balance, in FEr~sams: MxruRn A'D Emtmcrr 58, 63-66 (Mcfahon ed.
1955).
88. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The Court
has not limited its concern for the political freedom of political minorities to review of
the electoral process. Perceiving the need for a political minority to organize effectively,
it has used the first and fourteenth amendment to frame a constitutional right of "asso-
ciation." See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YAM .J.
1, 2 (1964). In Baker v. Carr, Justices Harlan and Frankfurter recognized the coincidence
of the Guarantee Clause and the Court's application of the Equal Protection Clause. 369
U.S. 00-01. See also Bonfield, Baker v. Carr. New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee
of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. Ray. 245 (1962); Emerson, Malapportionment
and Judicial Power, 72 YAE. L.J. 64, 71-72 (1962).
89. See notes 9 and 87 supra and accompanying text.
90. FEanssuns AND CIVIL RIGHTS 81.
91. Cf. Henkin, Voice of a Modern Federalism, in FE.x. FRaNLmrm uim JuncE 104.
07 (Mendelsohn ed. 1964).
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portance of factions, which have no place in separate function theory,
was central to Madison's model of the federal system. To Madison,
federalism was a unified political process, in which the same factions
compete for power in both state and federal governments. By ignoring
the relevance of factions to the Southern problem, separate function
theory produces a variety of empirical distortions. Its exponents under-
estimate the task of changing unconstitutional state policies,O2 and
exaggerate the political changes which would accompany any shift of
power to federal institutions.93 They see no real alternatives between
state self-improvement and federal occupation; any "incursion of re-
mote federal authority" will cause "debilitation of local responsibility,"
and require indefinite expansion of the federal role."
Finally, by identifying political violence as a problem of "individual
rights," separate function theory grossly understates the problem in
the South. As Burke Marshall himself has complained:
92. Because the separate function model does not break the state into factions, It
cannot picture maltreatment of a weak faction as the product of a dominant faction's
monopolization of political power. Perceiving the state as a sort of classless collectivity,
rather than an arena of warring factions, separate function theorists rest their hopes for
the vindication of federal rights on unreal possibilities. They speak as if they expect
the state to change its mind without coercion:
We are told that local authorities can not be relied upon for courageous and
prompt action, that they often have personal or political reasons for refusing to
prosecute. If it be significantly true that crimes against local law cannot be locally
prosecuted, it is an ominous sign indeed. In any event, the cure is a reinvigoration
of State responsibility.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 160 (1945) (Frankfurter, Jackson, and Roberts, JJ.,
dissenting).
Apparently seeking to spur such a "reinvigoration of State responsibility," executive
officials have preferred traditional judicial methods, supplemented by imprecation and
negotiation with local officials. See FEDERALIs-- AND CIVIL RIGHTs 75, 78.
93. Equating federal administration with control by "national" interests, state admin-
istration with control by "local" interests, separate function theorists overlook the ins.
pact of local influence on the federal political and legal processes. In fact federal officials
-in Congress, in state FBI and U.S. Attorney's offices, and on the district bench-are
hardly unsympathetic to local mores or unresponsive to local pressures. See Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism, 54 COLUnl. L. REV. 543 (1954); PELTASON, F1Ir-
EIGHT LONELY MEN 3-30 (1961); Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73
YALE L.J. 90 (1963). Some local influence is compelled by the Constitution, especially by
the sixth amendment's tightly drawn requirement that federal criminal defendants be
tried before a jury drawn from the district in which the crime was committed, U.S.
CONsr. amend. VI. If Justice Department officials are to be believed, the power of
Southern juries to nullify civil rights statutes deterred even their invocation for many
years. Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297, 1298-
99 (1965); Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
532, 546 (1961).
94. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 160-61 (1945) (Frankfurter, Jackson, Roberts,
JJ., dissenting). See note 117 infra.
1026 [Vol. 754: 1007
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The problem is that legal concepts have developed in terms of
individual personal rights, but the rights of masses, of an entire
race, are affected all at once.95
Marshall thought these "legal concepts" prescribed the same remedies
for civil rights violations as for personal injuries--namely, lawsuits,
preferably brought by the victim himself. 00 As Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, Marshall regarded more extensive modes of
intervention as out-of-bounds for a federal administrator. He needed
a different theory, one which distinguished between deprivations of
"individual rights" and of the rights of "an entire race," and which
could adjust accordingly its prescriptions for federal policy.
This equation of isolated threats to "individual rights" with per-
vasive subversion of local democracy signifies more than a factual mis-
take. It reflects a failure to give an adequate account of the ultimate
goals of federalism, and a consequent confusion about the implications
of federalism for policy. By barring federal interference with local
functions, separate function theorists believe they are promoting
pluralism. They are correct in claiming pluralism as an objective of
federalism. But, handicapped by a simplistic notion of political power,
their analysis produces a mistaken recipe for pluralism. Moreover,
they fail to see that democracy and individual liberty rank with plu-
ralism as values which federal government is designed to serve.
By pluralism, separate function theorists correctly intend a political
process in which power is scattered among all significant groups, or-
ganizations, and institutions.9 7 But they jump to the false conclusion
that promoting pluralism invariably requires restricting federal power.
Taken seriously, this conclusion would mean that pluralism is per-
petuated by the mere existence of two isolated centers of governmental
power. There would be no need for interaction between them. In par-
ticular the federal government would have no claim to virtue as a guar-
dian of pluralism.98 Its proper role would be confined to functions
beyond the capability of the states. This limited conception of the
utility of a central government was explicit in Thomas Jefferson's
95. F ', . .. m AND ClviL RIGHTS 8.
96. Id. at 50.
97. See DAHL, A PREFACE TO Dmasoc:xTic THEORY 137 (1956). For a summary of the
characteristics of pluralist thought, see LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DLsocRAcv 12-
16 (1964).
98. THo.iMs, FEux FRAN umTFR: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCi 206 (1960); Hcnkin, supra
note 91, at 71 (1964).
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writings. For him the Union was necessary only to conduct foreign
relations. 99
Justice Frankfurter's generation of theorists has embraced the ex-
pansion of federal domestic responsibility for economic matters.'00
They have, moreover, supported an adventuresome role for the Su-
preme Court under the Reconstruction amendments-'0 ' But at times
they echo Jefferson, characterizing the protection of political values
as a minor and aberrational federal function. They approve of inter-
ference with local law enforcement, even in the form of Supreme
Court review, only when state conduct "shocks the conscience.
''102
Contradicted by the federal judiciary's vital contemporary role in
safeguarding basic political values, this Jeffersonian notion survives
because of a popular misunderstanding of the relation between power
and pluralist politics. Separate function theorists understand, by
power, the total physical capability of a government. The most danger-
ous government is the "biggest" government, the one with the greatest
physical capability, without regard to the objectives for which, the
manner in which, and the people over whom, that capability can be
brought to bear. But pluralism is not only concerned with the total
capability of government, but also with a second dimension of power.
This is the actual control exercised by government over the lives of
citizens. From the standpoint of Alabama Negroes the local sheriff may
be considerably more powerful, in this sense, than J. Edgar Hoover.
Federalist theory accounted for this second dimension of power.
The Federalists' model emphasized the need for an active federal role
to prevent accumulation and abuse of control over the lives of citizens.
They recognized that local factions would stifle pluralism if federal
remedies were not available to stop such factions from gaining and
exploiting their monopolies of political power.
03
In the Federalists' model, the federal government guaranteed local
democracy as well as local pluralism. The link between the two values
was representative institutions or "republican government" which the
Federalists believed was essential to the functioning of pluralism.
10 4
99. Mom, THE PROBLEI OF FEERALISi 82 (1931).
100. Henkin, supra note 91, at 89-92.
101. It is interesting that Justice Frankfurter and the "passivist" faction of the Court
acted little less inconsistently with his theoretical imperatives than did the activists.
Compare Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), with Malinski v. New York, 324
U.S. 401, 412 (1945). Compare Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953), with Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237-38 (1961).
102. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
103. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
104. Only through the ballot could the many control the few-that is, could factions
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Moreover, popular participation in government was considered an
end in itself. Even the theorists committed to the virtues of local power,
Jefferson, Calhoun, and de Tocqueville, emphasized the scope decen-
tralization allowed for participation by the citizenry in government, 105
unlike current defenders of localism, who emphasize big government as
a danger to pluralism. 06
By making no provision for an expanded federal role when local
democracy is at stake, separate function theory reveals its cardinal
defect. It produces a model which cannot even identify the objectives
which underlie the American choice of a federal system.
IV. FEDERAISM AND Clv1L RIGHTS: A REFORMULATION
If the separate function model misrepresents the relationship be-
tween federalism and federal protection of civil rights, how should the
conventional understanding be refined? The Federalists' theory offers
a basic framework, although modem experience dictates some modifi-
cations.
Federalism aims to promote, not only pluralism, the dispersal of
power among distinct units, but also democratic participation and in-
dividual liberty. As forecast by THE FE ERALIST, these values have been
threatened less by expanding federal power than by small, unpoliced
concentrations of power. With rare exceptions, federal institutions
have been the only means of checking powerful local factions. 07
poor in economic or other forms of power but great in number protect their interests.
Madison, as well as Jefferson, recognized this point. See Huntington, supra note 7, at
183-84.
105. CALHOUN, A DISCOURSE ON THE CONSTITUTON AND GoujLNxsENT OF Tur UNn'ED
STATES 215 (1852) (noting that local government reflects local needs better than policies
made by federal institutions, an indirect defense of localism on democratic grounds);
Huntington, supra note 7, at 175-76; 1 DE TOCQUEVLLE, DE3stOCAc" IN A.'srsUc& 93-100
(Vintage ed. 1960).
106. See note 90 supra.
107. See THE PREsmFrNT's CominTrrra ON CIVIL Rscirrs, To ScuRE TnEsE RIGorrs 25,
99-100 (1947). For typical instances of local governmental attacks on political and social
minorities, see Hague v. CIO, 307 US. 496 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
Yick WVo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
US. 144, 152 n.4, the Court noted that the "insular" position of local minorities may
require special federal judicial concern raising the question whether:
. . . legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to
more exacting judicial scrutiny . . . than are most other types of legislation...
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
The unique genius of white supremacists in the South has lain, not in their ability
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While the Federalists recognized that the states were susceptible to
factional domination, they did not provide instruments for curbing
the abuses which have become characteristic of local politics. They
made explicit provision in the Constitution only for the destruction
of republican government. Perhaps they believed that representative
institutions would ensure by themselves the survival of pluralism.
Pluralist politics might guarantee individual liberty, on the theory
that no faction would confer on government tyrannical power which
might later be turned against it.108
In fact, republican government in the states has rarely collapsed,109
but its persistence has not always guaranteed individual liberty. When
important factions agree, individual liberty has been a frequent
victim. 10 Direct intervention has usually been unnecessary to protect
individual and minority rights. Instead, federal judicial review has ful-
filled the federal function of protecting basic political values, where
local democracy has failed to do the job itself."1
to dominate local politics, but in their success in hamstringing the federal checking
mechanism which tempers abuse in other areas. See KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS 9 (1949):
The critical element in the structure of black-belt power has been the southern
Senator and his actual, if not formal, right to veto proposals of national interven-
tion to protect Negro rights. The black belts have had nothing to fear from state
governments on the race question.. . . On the fundamental issue, only the Federal
Government was to be feared.
For discussion of a proposed local solution to problems of local abuse, see Gelihorn,
The Swedish Justiteoombudsman, 75 YALE L.J. 1 (1965); Gellhorn, The Ombudsman in
New Zealand, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 1155 (1965); Gellhorn, Protecting Citizens against Admin-
istrators in Poland, 65 COLUm. L. REV. 1133 (1965); Gellhorn, Finland's Official Watch-
man, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 327 (1966); Gellhorn, Settling Disagreements with Officials in
Japan, 79 HARV. L. REV. 685 (1966); Anon., Raise High the Proof Sheets, Ombudsnan 13
J. PUB. ORDER 471 (1966).
108. In THE FEDERALIST No. 51, Madison appears to accept the theory that liberty In
the states will be substantially guaranteed by the existence of republican institutions,
and that the requirement of federal protection should be limited to the emergency situ-
ation contemplated by the Guarantee Clause. Yet this view contradicts the implications
of the principal fear discussed in THE FEDERALIST No. 10-the likelihood of single-interest
legislative majorities in the states. If the latter fear is a significant problem, then Inter-
mediate federal intervention would seem necessary to correct moderate abuses of power
by majority factions.
109. The most prominent and, perhaps, the only example is the deep South between
1877 and 1965. However, malapportionment must be recognized as a widespread, If more
subtle, invasion of the principles of the Guarantee Clause; similarly, state Invasions of
first amendment freedoms which have called forth especially vigilant judicial protection
challenge the federal responsibility to protect local democracy. See note 88 supra.
110. See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
111. Cf. Vose, Interest Groups, Judicial Review, and Local Government, 19 W. Pol.
Q. 85 (1966).
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It is fortunate that judicial review has been an effective check on
local abuse, for it does not threaten the administrative bases of state
power." 2 Strong state institutions have become even more important
since the eighteenth century, because of the unforeseen growth of fed-
eral power."
3
But the federal government is not the only significant threat to basic
political values. Nor is judicial review the only tolerable form of fed-
eral intervention. Where local abuse cannot be locally corrected,
federal institutions should take whatever action is required to restore
the regime contemplated by the guarantee clause and the Reconstruc-
tion amendments.
By itself this analysis does not refute opponents of "direct inter-
vention" in the South. It does, however, recast the problem. The
question is not whether to favor "individual rights" and forget federal-
ism, but how best to serve federalism. Abstention, by denying the
benefits of pluralist democracy to the Negro population of the South,
perpetuates an immediate, though localized, affront to the objectives
of federalism. Intervention, so the argument runs, creates a potential
but nationwide danger-the possibility of inefficiency, abuse and even
tyranny, which might result from increased centralization of law en-
forcement responsibility.
Although we cannot disregard doubts about the future use of power
employed in the South, we should not give them the credence which the
case for abstention requires. Many expressions of such skepticism re-
flect an indiscriminate aversion to bigness. Preoccupied with the total
capability of the federal government,1 1 4 separate function arguments
assume that power is cumulative. But the political effects of federal
action are not so simple. Power to aid the Southern Negro does not
necessarily augment the government's power to coerce Midwestem
businessmen, Northern welfare recipients, or Vietnamese Commu-
nists.115
Opposition to intervention is also founded on more precise fears.
Condemning federal law enforcement, separate function theorists ar-
gue that totalitarianism characteristically begins with centralization
112. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
113. See Morgenthau, Modern Science and Political Power, 64 COLUM. L REv. 13 6.
1891-1409 (1964). Cf. Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 471, 474-75 (1928).
114. See note 102 supra and accompanying text.
115. Unless one assumes that federal protection in turbulent Southern areas implies
a large and permanent federal police force, it is difficult to see what sort of correlati~c
dangers would be created by more effective federal action in the South.
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of police power.110 On this ground they oppose "starting down the
path that would lead inevitably to the creation of a national police
force."' 17 They fear measures which might make local police subser-
vient to the unchecked power of federal law enforcement agencies.'"
But the facts do not substantiate this fear. Many of the most effective
forms of intervention involve little danger of a "national police force,"
for example, district court power to stop sham prosecutions against
civil rights workers. Moreover, under present circumstances increased
federal scrutiny should be one of the most effective ways of avoiding a
cohesive national police power. Instead of disregarding violations of
federal civil rights statutes in the interest of harmony,"09 federal agen-
cies will have to loosen their ties to local police. If, as is generally sup-
posed, this "countervailing power" mechanism safeguards pluralism
in other sectors,120 it should achieve the same result in law enforcement.
Finally, fears of federal surveillance are unjustified because the fed-
eral role need only be temporary. At present, federal intervention
would be justified only to assure protection for those who seek to
democratize Southern politics. When local officials are forced to respect
the demands of organized Negro voters, the civil rights unit in the
FBI can be disbanded.
Thus, where federal protection is necessary to enfranchise Negroes
in the South, intervention is a positive instrument of federalism. Fed-
eralism may require restraint in the processing of individual consti-
tutional claims. It may even require caution in combating regional
resistance to a federal law hostile to all classes of people in the
region.' 21 But the repression of an entire class in its first political effort
116. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 70-71
(1955).
117. Former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, introduction to FEDERALISM AND
CIVIL Rsicrs ix.
118. JACKSON, op. cit. supra note 116, at 71-72.
119. Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46 CORNEL.L L.Q. 532,
546 (1961).
120. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER Chs.
IX, X (1952).
121. The Federalists' emphasis on the need for full federal power to assure the su-
premacy of federal law rested on their conviction that intensive federal action would
be infrequent, and, since it had to be the product of a joint decision by various compet-
ing factions, was unlikely to be sinister in its objectives. But they were unable to relate
systematically their reasoning from the principle of federal supremacy to the political
values which intervention was designed to serve. And, indeed, there is no reason why
intervention should in all cases promote pluralism or democracy or individual liberty.
It could, for example, be argued that these values were, if anything, frustrated by
President Jackson's forceful measures to quash South Carolina's attempt to nullify the
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does not justify such caution. Intervention to shelter the growth of
pluralist democracy in the deep South promotes the objectives of
federalism. The model contemplated by the framers of the original
Constitution, as refined by the Reconstruction amendments, casts the
federal government in precisely this role as guarantor of the integrity
of the local political process.
V. THE SCOPE OF PROTECTION UNDER CURRENT LA-%v AND POLICY
The dictates of separate function theory affect three areas of contro-
versy: (1) whether federal courts should ignore the rules of comity and
grant relief from official harassment of civil rights activities; (2)
whether the Department of Justice should make active use (a) of civil
rights criminal and injunctive sanctions, and (b) of federal enforce-
ment personnel, to control intimidation and, (3) whether the state
action doctrine should continue to restrict the federal government's
constitutional power to provent private interference with Reconstruc-
tion amendment rights. As feared by separate function theorists, "in-
escapable pressures" from the "immediacy and urgency of the protest
movement"1 22 have shaken the hold of their theory in each of these
areas. But the changes of the past two years have not led to a reformu-
lation of federalism theory. Consequently, courts and administrators
have not developed a consistent policy toward civil rights enforcement.
A. Judicial Control of Official Harassment
1. General Harassment and Threatened Prosecutions. Until the
spring of 1965, federal judicial restraint sheltered the favored instru-
ment of political intimidation in the South-the sham criminal prose-
cution. 23 But in Dombrowski v. Pfister a five-man Supreme Court
majority rejected the view that comity forbids all prior restraint of
state criminal proceedings.
2 4
Dombrowski was a civil action brought by a Louisiana civil rights
Tariff of Abominations in 1832. Hence, if federalism is considered a political system
designed to further political values, rather than a legal system designed to assure the
supremacy of federal law, the Supremacy Clause cannot be, by itself, a sufficient answer
to separate function opposition to intervention.
122. FEDERtALI s AND CIVIL RIGHTS 56, 77.
123. See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113
U. PA. L. Rav. 793, 794-801 (1965).
124. 380 U-S. 479 (1965). The decision substantially modified Douglas v. City of Jean.
nette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), and appeared to overrule Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167
(1959). See notes 25 and 39 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 133-136 infra and
accompanying text.
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group, asking injunctive relief from threatened prosecution under a
state anti-subversive statute. Petitioners alleged, first, that the prose-
cution was a sham intended solely to discourage civil rights activities
and, second, that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. 125 Reversing
dismissal of the suit by a three-judge district court,120 the Supreme
Court held that proof that the prosecution was instituted in "bad faith"
would justify injunctive relief. 27 Moreover, it held the abstention
doctrine inapplicable to all free speech cases involving statutes void
on their face for vagueness. 12 8 All future prosecutions under the vague
Louisiana statute were enjoined pending a limiting construction in a
declaratory judgment action in state courts.
1 29
The Dombrowski majority broke its habit of automatic deference.
But neither the vagueness nor the bad faith ground for the injunction
fits the distinctive features of the problem-systematic harassment of
a political minority. Vague statutes are not the sole instrument of
harassment. Local officials bent on crushing an opposition do not need
vague statutes; investigation, arrest, brutality, and prosecution under
perfectly precise statutes can serve them just as well.130
Because the Court made vagueness on independent ground for pre-
trial relief, its opinion authorized district courts to disrupt state pro-
cedures unnecessarily. Injunctions are not justified merely to halt an
isolated prosecution under a questionable statute; Supreme Court re-
view adequately protects the defendant and possible subjects of future
regulation. Similarly, if the abstention doctrine makes any sense at
all,1 3 1 it should be applied in individual cases free from overtones of
harassment.
3 2
The Court apparently recognized that, absent the "bad faith" of
125. 380 U.S. at 482.
126. 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964).
127. 380 U.S. at 490.
128. Id. at 489-91.
129. Id. at 491.
130. To cope with such situations, the Court has invented the notion that a statute
can be "vague as applied"-i.e., not vague but applied by state officials to conduct not
covered by its terms. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545-51 (1965); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). The vague as applied doctrine covers cases of sham
prosecutions which cannot be reached by the "no evidence" rule of Thompson v. Louis-
ville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
131. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
132. This rule should apply at least in instances where a single case will produce a
definitive state court construction of the statute, which will either be sufficiently narrow
to withstand appeal to the Supreme Court or will, hence, be rejected by the Court.
This analysis would single out cases like Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) as In-
stances justifying direct intervention. See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Dombrowshi, 380
U.S. at 500.
[Vol. 75:10071034
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Louisiana officials in Dombrowski, intervention against unconstitu-
tional statutes may be unwarranted. In Wells v. Reynolds, decided in
October, 1965, a 6-3 majority affirmed a district court's denial of in-
junctive relief from prosecution under one of Georgia's anti-insurrec-
tion laws. 133 The statute was substantially identical to one struck down
in 1963 by Chief Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit in ordering the
pre-trial release of civil rights workers arrested in Americus, Georgia. 134
Petitioner Wells was likewise a civil rights leader. But his case arose
out of a near-riot in Albany, Georgia, rather than the passive demon-
stration involved in the Americus controversy1as His arrest was not
immediately preceded by investigations designed solely to harass, as
was the suit in Dombrowski.
By denying relief on a record devoid of evidence of bad faith, the
Court shortened the reach of Dombrowski. The Court did not specify,
however, what qualifications it intended to introduce, for neither the
majority nor the dissenting justices delivered opinions. 30
133. 382 U.S. 39 (1965), affirming, 238 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ga. 1965). The District Court's
decision came down before Dombrowski was decided.
134. Aelony v. Pace, 8 Race Rel. L. Rep. 1355 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
Wells was arrested for violation of two statutes, GA. CoDE § 26-902, invalidated in
Aelony (and before that in Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937)), and § 26-90-1:
§ 26-902. Attempt to incite insurrection.
Any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others to join in any com-
bined resistance to the lawful authority of the State shall constitute an attempt
to incite insurrection.
§ 26-904. Circulating insurrectionary papers.
If any person shall bring, introduce, print, or circulate, or cause to be introduced.
circulated, or printed, or aid or assist, or be in any manner instrumental in
bringing, introducing, circulating, or printing within this State any paper. pam-
phlet, circular, or any writing, for the purpose of inciting insurrection, riot, con-
spiracy, or resistance against the lawful authority of the State, or against the
lives of the inhabitants thereof, or any part of them, he shall be punished by
confinement in the penitentiary for not less than five nor longer than 20 )ears.
The Solicitor General of Georgia dropped charges under the invalid § 26.902, but not
under its counterpart. 238 F. Supp. at 783.
135. In Aelony, defendants were arrested while kneeling in prayer before the Ameri-
cus, Georgia jail. Charged with inciting insurrection, a capital offense, they were held
without bond, until Chief Judge Tuttle ordered their release, five months after their
arrest. 8 Race Rel. Rep. 1355. In Wells, petitioner was arrested for circulation of fliers
announcing a meeting to protest the shooting of a Negro by a local police officer. The
fliers were inflammatory, accusing the police of murder in this and other instances. The
meeting led to a march on City Hall, during which the district court found that bottles
and bricks were thrown at business establishments passed en route. After the petitioner,
leader of the march, left to carry his protest message to city police officials, the crowd
turned to deliberate vandalism against several small white-owned shops. Hearing by
telephone of the riot, police arrested the petitioner while in conference with him. 238
F. Supp. at 782-83.
136. It is therefore not definite that absence of bad faith was perceived by the ma-
jority to be the crucial feature distinguishing Wells from Dombrowski. They may have
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The Court's confusion was more apparent in the second federal-
state injunction situation to come before it after Dombrowski. The
case was Cameron v. Johnson, a prosecution of civil rights demon-
strators under Mississippi's recently enacted anti-picketing statute.1
3a
Since the statute had been narrowly drawn to test the limits of recent
Supreme Court rulings, 38 the case met neither of Dombrowski's pre-
requisites for injunction. The statute was not vague on its face. 13
Further, since the constitutionality of their conduct was a close ques-
tion, defendants could not show that the particular prosecution was
instituted in bad faith.140 State officials could not be certain under such
circumstances that the defendant's conduct was within the scope of
the first amendment. Hence, they would not be deliberately violating
federal rights by starting a prosecution which they knew in advance
would be reversed.
Apparently recognizing that Dombrowski required dismissal in
Cameron, but wishing nevertheless to grant relief, the Court re-
sponded with troubled obscurity. By a 5-4 margin, it reversed the dis-
trict court's denial of relief. The majority did not refer to the lower
court's validation of the statute's terms, nor to its findings of fact.
Instead, in what the dissent termed a "cryptic" per curiam paragraph,
the case was remanded. The district court was directed to reconsider
its dismissal "in light of criteria set forth" in Dombrowski.'4' Dissent-
been less indignant about the provisions of the Georgia anti-insurrectionary circulation
statute than about Louisana's adaptation of the Smith Act. Yet, the statute, at least Insofar
as it bans circulating, or aiding, or assisting, etc., or circulating papers "for the purpose
of inciting . . . resistance against the lawful authority of the State .... " seems at least
as defective as the invalid § 26-902.
137. 381 U.S. 741 (1965). Cameron was handed down June 7, 1965, and hence preceded
Wells v. Reynolds.
138. The legislative history of the statute is described in Chevlgny, A Busy spring in
the Magnolia State, in SoUrTHEN JusnrcE 13, 26-27 (1965). The law provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, singly or in concert with others, to engage
in picketing or mass demonstrations in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably
interfere with free ingress or egress to and from any public premises, State property,
county or municipal courthouses, city halls, office buildings, jails, or other public
buildings or property owned by the State of Mississippi, or any county or municipal
government located therein, or with the transaction of public business or adminis-
tration of justice therein or thereon conducted or so as to obstruct or unreasonably
interfere with free use of public streets, sidewalks, or other public ways adjacent or
contiguous thereto.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 2318.5(1) (Supp. 1964). Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55
(1964) .
139. 381 US. 741, 745 (1965) (dissenting opinion of Black, J.); id. at 757 (dissenting
opinion of White, J.).
140. 380 U.S. at 487-88. Cf. Mr. Justice White's dissent in Cameron v. Johnson, 381
U.S. at 755-56; Note, The Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REV. 105, 170-71 (1965).
141. 381 U.S. 741, 742 (1965).
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ing, Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart, and White condemned the ma-
jority for backing away from resolution of issues of "such great im-
portance."'-'  The petition for review raised unambiguous questions
of law, and the dissenters saw no excuse for the majority's unwilling-
ness to resolve them for itself.
143
As the Cameron majority appeared to believe, Dombrowski forbids
intervention in some cases where it is needed. Wherever, as in
Cameron, valid statutes are invoked against acts just within constitu-
tional limits, Dombrowski would keep federal district judges from
granting a pretrial hearing. It would bar intervention even in areas
where harassment is rampant and state court delay is predictable. But
in such cases eventual reversal by the Supreme Court is an illusory
remedy for political minorities. Three years of criminal litigation will
hamstring a registration drive.'4
The Court can master its difficulties if it adheres more closely to the
Madisonian logic implicit in Dombrowski's result. Statutory vagueness
should be eliminated as an independent ground for intervention. The
bad faith standard should be broadened to require consideration of
the general pattern of police conduct toward the complaining group.
Where there is substantial evidence of political harassment, federal
courts must in effect censor local regulation of the threatened group.
Such circumstances justify displacement of state courts as fact-finders
and as immediate checks on law enforcement officials. Given a history
of harassment, federal courts should be empowered to enjoin any
prosecution which is neither groundless nor based on constitutionally
protected conduct. To cope with the emergency, the courts must in-
validate or restrict the range of statutes which lend themselves to abuse,
like the anti-subversive statute disposed of in Dombrowski, or the anti-
insurrection statute left standing in Vells 1
4
G
142. Id. at 743. (Black, J.).
143. Id. at 747-48, 759.
144. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
145. The suggested approach would produce less frequent disruption of state criminal
administration than that proposed by Professor Amsterdam. Amsterdam would hate
rules of comity suspended whenever a state criminal defendant could make out a color-
able claim that the conduct which the state labels criminal is a protected activity under
the first and fourteenth amendments. He would allow direct intervention. without a
showing of a pattern of harassment directed at the defendant prior to the action. Amnster-
dam, supra note 123, at 800. (Amsterdam's argument in the cited article goes only to
removal and habeas corpus devices for aborting sham prosecutions, discussed at notes
156-58 infra, but his logic would extend to injunctive remedies also.) This proposal is
based on his assumption that all state courts, not just those of the deep South. are less
likely than federal courts to protect the federal rights of political minorities. Id. at 836-
38, 909-10. For this assumption Professor Amsterdam offers no proof, and, indeed, all
his examples, especially the scenario at the beginning of the piece from which the argu-
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2. Pending Prosecutions. Proof of harassment should permit injunc-
tion of pending as well as future prosecutions. Victims of political
persecution should not be denied prompt relief, simply because the
state files its indictments before their petition reaches the federal
court. 146 But Section 2283 of Title 18 of the federal code appears to
dictate otherwise. The statute bans injunctions of state judicial pro-
ceedings except when "expressly" permitted by act of Congress. 41
Cameron involved a state prosecution which had been formally initi-
ated before the defendants sought a federal injunction. 148 Petitioners
argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the section on which their claims of
unconstitutional state action was based, constitutes a statutory excep-
tion to § 2283.1-9
Although one circuit court decision supports this claim, °10 the
weight of authority is otherwise.'1 ' Read literally, § 1983 does not
"expressly" except itself from the sweep of § 2283.152 Moreover, the
courts may have been inhibited by the breadth of § 1983, which grants
relief for any violation "under color of law" for any federal right.
Exempting all of § 1983 from the anti-injunction statute would create
a massive exception to the principle of comity underlying the statute.
Nevertheless, limitation of § 2283 need not await an act of Congress.
The majority in Cameron v. Johnson could have created a judicial
ment takes off, are taken from the deep South. If similar problems exist In other areas,
there is certainly no justification for assuming that their gravity matches that obtaining
in the South. Federalism does compel federal institutions to intervene when necessary
to protect minorities from political oppression. It does not, however, support a pre.
sumption that such protection is always necessary, until it is shown to be so.
146. The artificiality of the distinction between pending and threatened prosecutions
is illustrated by comparing the Wells v. Reynolds situation, supra notes 133-36, with that
presented by Cameron v. Johnson, supra notes 137-39. Although in Wells, defendant had
been arrested, charged, held in jail for a time, then released on $2,500 bail, his case
was not a pending prosecution covered by § 2283, because no indictment had been filed.
Cameron differed from Wells only in that it was a pending prosecution, to which, under
present law, § 2283 attaches, banning federal injunctive interference.
147. The statute provides:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary In
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments,
28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
148. 381 U.S. at 746-47. See note 146 supra.
149. Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
150. Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119, 124 (3d Cir. 1950).
151. Smith v. Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856, 859 (7th Cir. 1957); Island S.S. Lines
Inc. v. Glennon, 178 F. Supp. 292, 295 (D. Mass. 1959) (alternative ground); cf. Baines v.
City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579, 589 (4th Cir. 1964).
152. See Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. Ray. 994, 1050-51
(1965).
1038 [Vol. 75:1007
FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS
exception to the reach of § 2283 without attempting to read an "ex-
press" authorization into the terms of § 1983. Although § 2283 appears
absolute by its terms, it has always been regarded as merely declaratory
of judicially formulated principles of comity.'5 Recognizing the sec-
tion's basis in comity doctrine, Judge Sobeloff in a recent Fourth
Circuit case, suggested its provisions were inapplicable under the
"special circumstances" created by repression of civil rights activities
in Danville, Virginia.15 These "special circumstances" parallel the
bad faith conduct recognized in Dombrowski as making comity re-
quirements inapplicable.155 Dombrowski should be held to require
adoption of Judge Sobeloff's similarly inspired exception to § 2283.
Dombrowski should also lead to acceptance of an alternative remedy
for sham prosecutions fashioned recently by the Fifth Circuit. The
appellate courts of the deep South have expanded the scope of the civil
rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443,1'6 to allow removal of any
state prosecution initiated in reprisal for the defendant's political
activities. 57 The considerations of comity motivating early restrictive
153. See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 I-Rv. L REv. ?A5, 367-78
(1930). Indeed, the judicially drawn distinction between "pending" and "threatened" or
future proceedings is itself an exception to the reach of the anti-injunction statute which
has no basis in its express language.
154. Baines v. City of Danville, 321 F.2d 643, 644 (4th Cir. 1963) (issuing temporary
restraining order); 337 F.2d 579, 599-600 (1964) (dissenting opinion). Cf. 34 U.S.L. WI.E
2348 (1966) (rehearing en banc) (dissenting opinion).
155. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964). The statute's terms provide that:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State
court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending-
(I) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such
State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent
with such law.
Civil rights lawyers have argued without success, in litigation and in print, that sub-
section (2) covers not only federal law enforcement officials, but also private persons
exercising federal rights. Amsterdam, supra note 123. It appears that the courts prefer
to handle the problem of aborting state prosecutions under the more manageable pro-
visions of § 1443(1).
157. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) and Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906)
held § 1443(1) applicable only to cases where denial of equal rights was compelled by
state statutory provisions. See note 28 supra. In Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th
Cir. 1965), Chief Judge Tuttle argued that this holding was merely ancillary to a major
premise that the denial of equal rights had to occur before trial. Therefore, he held,
petitioners in Rachel were entitled to removal. Petitioners were prosecuted under state
trespass statutes while sitting in at a restaurant subsequently covered by Title II of the
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decisions under the removal statute58 are inappropriate under con-
ditions of political harassment, as they were in Dombrowski itself.
B. The Department of Justice as Prosecutor and Policeman
In the hands of vigilant lower courts, direct judicial remedies for
unconstitutional prosecutions have often halted official harassment.',,
Nevertheless, the courts alone cannot make civil rights activity safe.
Judicial orders are effective only when obeyed; if they are disobeyed,
as must be expected where federal law upsets local mores, the federal
executive must enforce them. 60 More important, the judiciary cannot
act alone against private violence or police brutality.
But like the courts, the Department of Justice has moved in fits and
starts toward assumption of its responsibilities in the South. In general
the Department has been more willing to prosecute civil rights offenses
than to impose direct prior controls through injunctions or policing
activity. And even consistent prosecution of civil rights crimes has
been a recent development. As late as 1964, in his review for a Colum-
bia University audience of executive civil rights policy, Burke Marshall
did not refer once to the availability of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242,101
criminal statutes passed by the Radicals in 1870-71.1°2 Officials justified
Civil Rights Act of 1964. The mere fact of prosecution and trial, regardless of Its out-
come, denied them equal rights guaranteed by the act as construed in Hamm v. City of
Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
This rule was subsequently applied and then extended to include all prosecutions
instituted solely to discourage the exercise of federal rights. Cooper v. Alabama, 353 F.2d
729; Rogers v. Tuscaloosa, 353 F.2d 78; Carmichael v. City of Greenwood, 352 F.2d 86;
McNair v. City of Drew, 351 F.2d 498; Wechsler v. County of Gadsden, 351 F.2d 311;
Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750; Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 678, cert. granted,
86 Sup. Ct. 532 (1966); Robinson v. Florida, 345 F.2d 133. (all 5th Cir. 1965). These cases
have brought harassment under subsection (1) by holding that "bad faith" prosecution
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment, a "law providing for
equal rights." Judge Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama has used the removal
statute to make his court a fact-finder in the first instance in civil rights prosecutions.
Compare Forman v. Montgomery, 245 F. Supp. 17 with MeMeans v. Mayor's Court, 247
F. Supp. 606 (both M.D. Ala. 1965).
158. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
159. For recent reported decisions in which the removal statute has been invoked as
a remedy for sham prosecution, see note 157 supra. Many other instances of successful
resort to removal have not, of course, been reported, as they have not reached the
appellate level.
160. Judge Johnson of the middle district of Alabama has often ordered the appear-
ance of the Department of Justice in controversial cases to assure that his rulings would
be enforced. Interview with federal official, Washington, D.C., Feb. 21, 1966.
161. Marshall's book, FEDERALiSM AND CIVIL RIGHTS, contains the lectures he delivered
on that occasion. See Van Alstyne, Book Review, 10 VILL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1964).
162. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964); 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964).
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their hands-off policy by stressing local responsibility for law enforce-
ment.163 They also spoke of the hostility of Southern juries, and argued
that losing cases would breed disrespect for federal law. 64
National outrage over civil rights killings in the summer of 1964
forced the Department to assume some enforcement responsibility.
Since then, most serious racial crimes have been prosecuted.0 5 To
avoid hostile grand juries, U.S. attorneys have been instructed to pro-
ceed by information under § 242, which treats official interference with
federal rights as a misdemeanor.1 0 John Doar, now Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights, has lent his ability and prestige to the prose-
cution of major cases, personally obtaining the conviction of Klansmen
charged with the Alabama slaying of Mrs. Viola Liuzzo.' 7
Although the Justice Department has rediscovered the criminal
statutes, it still feels bound by Burke Marshall's maxim, "[T]here is
nothing to do unless something happens."10 18 This commandment un-
derlies the Department's reluctance to request injunctions against
local enforcement officials.'0 9 Only widespread publicity, as in Selma
163. See generally FEDEA m5m AND CIVIL RIGHMs.
164. Note, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE LJ. 1297,
1298 (1965). Critics termed the argument unpersuasive. Id. at 1298-99. It was also not
entirely accurate. Under President Truman, a more active Department of Justice was
able to obtain convictions in the South with § 242. Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d
711 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 852 (1951); Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d
476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831 (1951); Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746
(5th Cir. 1947).
Another problem widely believed to be a major obstacle to effective enforcement was
also a chimera. This was the supposed difficulty of proving specific intent in accordance
with the requirements of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Despite the Screws
test, Southern juries apparently, at least in some cases, returned convictions. According
to an embittered footnote in Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Monroe v,. Pape. some
Southern federal trial judges sympathetic to the objectives of the statute interpreted the
rule in Screws somewhat liberally, to aid enforcement. 365 U.S. 167, 207 (1961). Once
the Department decided to reinvigorate the statutes in 1965, convictions proved obtain-
able.
165. The Department has prosecuted the notorious Schwerner-Goodman-Chaney slay-
ing in Philadelphia, Mississippi, during the summer of 1964. United States v. Price, 86
Sup. CL 1152 (1966); the Klansmen responsible for the death of Lemuel Penn in Georgia
during the same summer, United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. CL 1170 (1966); the Klansmen
who killed Mrs. Viola Liuzzo on a highway near Selma, Alabama, in 1955, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 4, 1965, p. 1, col. 4; and those responsible for the firebomb slaying of a Hattiesburg,
Mississippi, druggist and incipient political leader of local Negroes, id., March 29, 1966,
p. 1, col. 6.
166. See LAw ENFORCF-MENT 116.
167. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 35, col. 2.
168. Bums, The Federal Government and Civil Rights, in SotrrntEx JusTicF 228, 243.
169. FEDERALi m AND CIVIL RIGHs 81.
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and Bogalusa, has prompted the Department to seek broad prohibi-
tions of local police abuses.1
70
Even less has the Justice Department been willing to calm volatile
Southern communities by sending federal enforcement personnel. In
the early nineteen sixties, Southern civil rights organizations first
broadcast their demand for a "federal presence."'' The Civil Rights
Commission continues to press the Department for direct federal pro-
tection 7 2 To be sure, some significant changes have occurred. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation now has an office in Jackson, elimi-
nating Mississippi's status as the only state without an FBI office. 1'7 3
The Bureau has begun to purge its Southern ranks of racially preju-
diced agents.174 It investigates terrorist groups with the thoroughness
formerly reserved for organized crime and subversive activities. But,
though a federal observer was in the car driven by the killer of Mrs.
Liuzzo, neither he nor any other FBI agent was-or is--authorized
to take preventive action or to make an on-the-spot arrest.
176
Defending this purely reactive posture, Justice Department officials
reject the principle that Justice Bradley considered "incontrovertible"
during Reconstruction-that the federal government may use all
means at its command to secure enjoyment of federal civil rights in
the South.'7 6 To justify their belief that federal peace-keeping activities
threaten federalism, officials have termed such intervention unautho-
rized by Constitution or statute' 77-in the teeth of plainly contrary
laws and cases. ' 78 They equate the demand for a federal presence with
170. United States v. U.S. Klans, 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961) (the freedom riders
crisis); Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (N.D. Ala. 1965) (Selma); United States v.
Sampson, Civil No. GC 6449 (N.D. Miss., Sept. 2, 1964). But even in these cases, the
Department delayed even the limited mode of intervention of seeking injunctive relief
until it was unavoidable. See FEDERALSIM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 64-65; LAW ENFORCEMENT
165-66.
171. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, LAWi ENFORCIMENT IN MIssIssIPPI 22-23 (1965).
172. LAw ENFORCEMENT 180-81.
173. Interview with federal official, Washington, D.C., Feb. 21, 1966.
174. Ibid.
175. SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 171; Wasserstrom, Book Review,
33 U. CHI. L. REV. 406, 411-12 n.17 (1966).
176. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 394-95 (1880). See notes 68-73 supra and accom-
panying text.
177. See, e.g., Attorney General Kennedy's remarks shortly after the Philadelphia,
Mississippi slaying in June 1964, in N.Y. Times, June 25, 1964, p. 18, col. 1.
178. Authority for any form of appropriate executive action to cope with mass depri-
vations of civil rights is manifestly granted by 10 U.S.C. § 333 (1964), originally enacted
by the Radical Republicans, 17 Stat. 14 (1871):
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other
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requests for a national police force,'70 although proposals for the active
use of federal enforcement personnel are intended to apply only to
selected areas. 80 While conspicuous investigative and policing activity
would not stop every maniac from firing into sharecroppers' cabins,
at least some would think twice. Organized, officially sponsored terror
would surely be reduced. As for the Department's argument that inter-
vention would undercut local efforts to preserve order,181 the contrary
is more likely-a federal presence would strengthen the hand of the
local forces of law and order.182
C. Federalism, Federal Supremacy, and the State Action Doctrine
Separate function theory has influenced federal policy in the South
mainly through discretionary rules and policies. At one significant
point, however, the notion that federalism requires state administrative
control of tort and criminal matters has entered constitutional doc-
trine. This is the state action requirement, which until March, 1966,
defined the reach of federal power to enforce the Reconstruction
amendments. The state action doctrine denied Congress power to leg-
islate against interference by private persons with the exercise or en-
joyment of Reconstruction amendment rights.Y8 Section 241, enacted
means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State,
any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it-
(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States
within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, priiilege,
immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the
constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right,
privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or
(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes
the course of justice under those laws.
In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied
the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
Even without explicit statutory authority, it would seem clear that the President has
the power, if not the duty, to do whatever is reasonably necessary to enforce federal law,
including the application of federal force or the invocation of federal injunctive prohi-
bitions. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 394-95 (1880); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895).
Cf. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 59 (1890).
Critics of Justice Department policy have repeatedly noted the transparency of official
denials of power to act. LAw ENFORCEMENT-r 144-66; Bums, supra note 168, at 235-40.
179. See note 117 supra; N.Y. Times, June 26, 1964, p. 15, col. 1.
180. LAw ENFORCEMENT 180-81; Soutmra REGIONAL COUNCIL, op. cit. supra note 171,
at 36-38.
181. Lmw ENFORCEMENT 175.
182. Cf. Black, Paths to Desegregation, in THF Occm.%siors OF JusnicE 145, 149.59 (1961).
183. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1876); United States v. Harris.
106 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1882). See Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE I.J. 1353, 1353-54 (1964).
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as part of the Ku Klux Act of 1870,184 exceeds the constitutional limits
set by the state action doctrine since it proscribes all conspiracies,
private as well as public, to impair the exercise of federal rights.8 5
By initiating prosecution of private racial offenses under § 241,180 the
Justice Department gave the Supreme Court occasion to re-examine
its commitment to "state action." Six justices took the opportunity in
United States v. Guest,87 a prosecution of Georgia Klansmen, to affirm
congressional power over private conduct under the amendments.'88
The Court's decision must have surprised many commentators, for
recent wrangling over the scope of the doctrine has seldom hinted any
doubt that state action was an immutable boundary of power under
the amendments. 8 9 The state action debate has never acknowledged
its theoretical source: a clash between the logic of federal legal suprem-
acy and separate function notions about federalism.
Broadly speaking, four approaches have been taken. The "pure" sep-
arate function position was adopted by Justices Frankfurter and
Jackson, in portions of their opinions in Screws v. United States90 and
Monroe v. Pape.191 They argued that state action included only action
sanctioned by the authoritative institutions of state government. Civil
rights offenses which were illegal under state law could not be made
federal crimes.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
185. The statute reads:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by
the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised
the same; or
If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of
another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both.
18 U.S.C. § 241 (1964).
186. See note 167 supra.
187. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
188. See notes 208-09 infra and accompanying text.
189. Cf. Frantz, supra note 183, at 1353. Few of the writers putting forth an interpreta-
tion of state action have distinguished between the scope of section I of the fourteenth
amendment itself and the scope of congressional power to "enforce" it. See Mr. justice
Brennan's opinion in United States v. Guest, 86 Sup. Ct. 1170, 191-92 (1966). See Van
Alstyne & Karst, 14 STAN. L. Rav. 3 (1961); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLU&I.
L. REv. 1083 (1960); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer; Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.
L. Rav. 473 (1962). Cf. Mr. justice Douglas' opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945).
190. 325 U.S. 91, 138-49 (1945) (joined by Roberts, J.).
191. 365 U.S. 167, 211-23 (1961).
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Although the Supreme Court rejected this restrictive conception of
state action, it held fast to the premise that state action defined the
limits of power to enforce the amendments.192 The Supreme Court
adopted a second understanding of state action, which includes any
individual official's conduct, whether or not his acts were prohibited
by state law.193 The Court's reluctance to extend federal power to
purely private conduct reflected acquiescence in the Frankfurter-
Jackson notion that federalism assigned social control to the states.19 4
A few commentators offered a third approach, designed to reconcile
the Southern Negro's need for federal protection from private vio-
lence with the assumed commands of federalism. This was the "break-
down" theory of state action.9 5 Federal laws against private action
would be allowed only where state protection of civil rights was inade-
quate or deliberately withheld. During Reconstruction the Supreme
Court in effect adopted the breakdown approach. Federal jurisdiction
over private conduct was confined to the South-where breakdown
conditions had occurred-by a more liberal construction of the fif-
teenth amendment than the fourteenth.1 9 The breakdown theory thus
satisfies the minimum requirements of Madisonian federalism; it per-
mits federal action wherever state law cannot prevent political
violence.1
9 7
But even the breakdown analysis of state action does not go as far
as the terms of § 241. The Radical Republicans who enacted this
across-the-board proscription of private interference with federal rights
accepted the fourth, and most liberal, construction of congressional
enforcement power. They relied on Justice Story's implied power doc-
trine, a pure federal supremacy approach. 9 8 To ensure the supremacy
of federal law, Justice Story held in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Congress
has implied power to secure the enjoyment of any constitutional rights
by proscribing all forms of interference. 99 It could be argued that
Justice Story's rule should not apply to Reconstruction amendment
192. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255-60 (1964) (opinion of Douglas, J.). See generally Van Aistyne,
Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE
LJ. 219.
193. Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 US. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373
U.S. 244 (1963); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
194. Cf. note 49 supra.
195. Frantz, supra note 183, at 1359-61; HARRas, THE Qusr FoR EQUAL.n 53 (1960).
196. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text.
198. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
199. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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rights, because the amendments contain a limited grant of enforce-
ment power. 200 The Radicals, however, interpreted the enforcement
clause as coinciding with, rather than limiting, the implied power
doctrine previously applied to other constitutional rights. 20 1
In United States v. Guest,202 the Supreme Court seems to have ac-
cepted the Radicals' construction of the enforcement sections of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments. In Guest, the defendants,
Georgia Ku Klux Klansmen, were alleged to have conspired to intimi-
date Negroes in the exercise of a number of specified federal rights,
among which was the right to equal protection created by the four-
teenth amendment.20
3
200. Any rational means for reaching a constitutional objective is within Congress'
power under Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the necessary and proper clause
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). When in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
Justice Story held Congress had implied power to secure the enjoyment of any consti-
tutional right, the means open to Congress under the Prigg doctrine were subject only
to the McCulloch definition of the boundaries of necessary and proper power. However,
section five of the fourteenth amendment states explicitly that "the Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." "Appro-
priate" could be read to confer more limited, more reviewable power than "necessary
and proper." This limiting construction of section five is strengthened by the legislative
history of the fourteenth amendment. A first version of the amendment introduced In
1865 by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction explicitly conferred necessary and proper
power on Congress; it read: "Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and Immunities
of citizens in the several States (Art. IV, § 2); and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property." The draft was eventually
called back into the Committee, when its Radical sponsors realized that it had no chance
to gain the 2/3 vote necessary for passage. See JAMEs, TlE FRAtING OF THE FoUtTEENTHI
AMENDMENT 50 (1956). The proposed amendment then went through a series of revisions,
each one increasingly vague, with the final version appearing with the declaratory and
enforcement sections separated. Id. at 82-83. Professor Bickel has interpreted this maneu.
vering to mean that "Congress was not to have unlimited discretion and it was not to
have the leeway represented by the 'necessary and proper' power." Bickel, The Original
Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60 (1955).
This legislative history has never figured in judicial interpretations of the terminology
finally settled on by the thirty-ninth Congress. After the Radicals in 1870-71 passed legis.
lation which could be permitted only by equating "appropriate" with "necessary and
proper," the Supreme Court's decisions upsetting Reconstruction laws were based on the
Court's analysis of the requirements of federalism. See Note, The Strange Career of
"State Action" under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 1448, 1'149-54 (1965).
The Court's use of "appropriate" as a vehicle for adjusting federal-state relations seems
consistent with the imprecise intentions of the framers of the amendment. See Bickel,
supra, at 60-62. Changed conditions justify the present Court's readjustment. See notes
212-14 infra and accompanying text.
201. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 86,
92-93 (1909); Frantz, supra note 183, at 1357-58; TENBROEK, TIlE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 98 (1951).
202. 86 Sup. Ct. 1170 (1966).
203. Three rights were allegedly threatened by the defendant's action: (1) the right
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Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court avoided re-examination
of the state action doctrine; joined by Justices Harlan and White, he
construed the pleadings to include an allegation that state action was
involved in the defendant's conspiracy.20 4 However, Mr. Justice Bren-
nan, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas,
felt compelled to face the constitutional question. They accepted the
Radicals' theory of federal power to enforce the amendments:
Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself, according to estab-
lished doctrine, "speaks to the State or to those acting under the
color of its authority," legislation protecting rights created by the
Amendment, such as the right to equal utilization of state facili-
ties, need not be confined to punishing conspiracies in which state
officers participate. Rather, § 5 authorizes Congress to make laws
that it concludes are reasonably necessary to protect a right cre-
ated by and arising under that Amendment; and Congress is thus
fully empowered to determine that punishment of private con-
spiracies interfering with the exercise of such a right is necessary
to its full protection. -o 5
Justices Clark, Fortas, and Black accepted Justice Stewart's construc-
tion of the indictment, but in dicta, stated their belief that "the spe-
cific language of § 5, the enforcement section of the amendment em-
powers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or
without state action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment
rights."206 Although their summary statement might merely indicate
acceptance of the breakdown theory, it seems more likely that Clark,
Fortas, and Black share Mr. Justice Brennan's willingness to resurrect
the Radicals' interpretation.2
07
The Court might have met the federal government's responsibility
to protect local minorities by simply adopting the breakdown ap-
proach.208 Nevertheless, it was justified in approving unlimited federal
jurisdiction over private interference with the amendments. -0 5 It is
to travel in interstate commerce; (2) the right to enjoy equal access to places of public
accommodation protected by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (3) the right
to equal access to state facilities secured by the fourteenth amendment.
204. 80 Sup. Ct. at 1177.
205. Id. at 1191.
206. Id. at 1180.
207. Had they differed with the construction elaborated by Mr. Justice Brennan. it
would seem that they would have made some indication of the nature of their disagree.
ment, especially since the tacit purpose of their remarks on the question was to provide
guidance for Congress in drafting scheduled new civil rights legislation. Cf. Mr. Justice
Harlan's disapproving footnote. 86 Sup. CL at 1180 n.l.
208. See notes 78-79 supra and acompanying text.
209. It is, however, hardly true, as asserted by Mr. Justice Clark, that this conclusion
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true that, outside the South, state tort and criminal law generally give
adequate protection against violence aimed at impairing the exercise
of Reconstruction amendment rights. 210 But Congress might reasonably
decide that federal rights could not be safely secured unless the Justice
Department held continuing authority to prosecute violent interfer-
ence, wherever and whenever such intimidation appeared. This judg-
ment would rest on Congress' fundamental responsibility to ensure
the supremacy of federal law.211 Only the most compelling reasons
could justify judicial veto of Congress's decision to overlap state law
enforcement responsibility.
At present, compelling reasons for such restrictions on congressional
power do not exist. The separate function fear of federal executive
supervision of local police officials under civil rights statutes, however
valid, is irrelevant to the question of extending enforcement jurisdic-
tion to private civil rights offenses.21 2 More important, it is too late to
throw up one's hands at the suggestion of a federal criminal law which
overlaps state legislation. The FBI and United States attorneys are now
deeply involved in the war against bank robberies, 2 3 pimping,
214
obscenity,215 narcotics, 216 and gambling.217 Authority to prosecute pri-
vate civil rights crimes, involves only a minimal erosion of the states'
remaining exclusive domain.218 Moreover, modern expansion of the
can be wrung from "the specific language" of section 5. 80 Sup. Ct. at 1180. See note 200
supra and accompanying text.
210. State law seems to give adequate protection against private interference. Of
course, state law is believed to give very inadequate protection against official interference
with Reconstruction amendment rights, as the plethora of actions against police officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since Monroe v. Pape indicates. See Shapo, Constitutional Tort:
Monroe v. Pape and The Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 277, 297-312 (1965).
211. See notes 199-201 supra and accompanying text. The differences between "appro.
priate" and "necessary and proper," if they exist, concern only what means Congress
may use to secure federal supremacy; they do not alter the ultimate objective of enforce-
ment-the integrity of the Supremacy Clause.
212. See notes 116-18 supra and accompanying text.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1964).
214. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1964).
215. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-65 (1964).
216. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1401-07 (1964).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964).
218. Ironically, the same New York Times which reported the first modem conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 241, Assistant Attorney General Doar's triumph in the Liuzzo killing,
also reported that a violator of the federal bank robbery statute had been sentenced to
death. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1965, p. 1, col. 1. For reasons never articulated, the qualms
about federal criminal jurisdiction voiced whenever civil rights enforcement is under
consideration, have never inhibited courts and commentators when discussing other activ.
ities of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, which have in fact eroded much
more than civil rights criminal statutes ever will the states' monopoly of responsibility
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due process clause2 19 has undermined the doctrinal foundation for
the post-Civil War Court's original decision to limit fourteenth amend-
ment enforcement power to "state action." Congress had originally
intended the privileges and immunities clause, not the due process
clause, to be the vehicle through which fundamental rights would be
protected from state as well as federal deprivation.22 0 In emasculating
the privileges and immunities clause,2 2 1 the Court aimed to prevent
federal interference with state law enforcement institutions, not only
by federal criminal law, but by Supreme Court review as well. The
Court wished to avoid a construction which would make it:
a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the states, on the civil
rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it
did not approve as consistent with those rights .... "2
Not sharing this aversion to Supreme Court review under the amend-
ments, the modern Supreme Court has used the bizarre doctrine of
"substantive due process" - 3 to sidestep the nineteenth century Court's
construction of the privileges and immunities clause. 24 Since the Court
has granted citizens a broad array of fourteenth amendment rights,
it should be prepared to secure their enjoyment by permitting Con-
gress and the executive to prevent all forms of interference. The state
action doctrine, which drew its strength from obsolete qualms about
federal law enforcement responsibility, should no longer override the
claim of federal supremacy.
for criminal matters. This double-standard, though unconscious and perhaps innocent,
has been interpreted by dvil rights advocates as subtle hypocrisy. Cf. Wasserstrom, Book
Review, 33 U. C_. L. REV. 406 (19R).
219. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); NAACP v. Button.
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
220. The framers did not "intend" to incorporate the first eight amendments per se,
but only those rights which are "fundamental." See generally Fairman, Does the Four-
teenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?-the Original Understanding, 2 STAN.
L. REV. 5 (1949); Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 1 (1954). The Slaughterhouse Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80-81 (1873), cursorily dismissed the claim that the equal protection
or due process clauses could serve as well as the privileges and immunities clause as
bases for incorporating basic guarantees against state action into the amendment.
221. The Slaughterhouse Cases, supra note 220. See 2 WARREN, TiM SuPaREM CouRT
iN UNTED STATzS HsroRY 5392 (1922).
222. The Slaughterhouse Cases, supra note 220, at 78.
223. The phrase is a contradiction in terms.
224. At present, almost all the essential rights guaranteed against federal invasion by
the first eight amendments have been incorporated. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965) (sixth amendment in its entirety); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (194) (self-incrimi-
nation privilege of the fifth amendment); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937)
(first amendment speech and assembly).
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Postscript: The Removal Cases-An Unexpected Regression
When it was decided in April 1965, Dombrowski v. Pfister seemed
to herald a radical expansion of federal protection for embattled local
minorities. 2205 But barely one year later the Supreme Court reneged.
On June 20, 1966, as this Comment was going to press, a 5-4 majority
reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Peacock
v. City of Greenwood.226 The Fifth Circuit had reinterpreted the civil
rights removal statute,227 to permit removal to a federal district court
of any state prosecution initiated solely to obstruct civil rights activ-
ity.228 Reversing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed nineteenth century
cases which confined removal to state trials prejudiced by a statute
discriminatory on its face. 229 Removal is thus unavailable to the civil
rights worker harassed by charges of unlawful assembly, sedition, or
lascivious carriage-characteristic guises of sham prosecutions in the
South.2
30
The Court, following the separate function faith, counts on an in-
dependent state judiciary to teach itself respect for federal rights and
then call a halt to police abuses.2 31 But this independent judiciary
225. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See notes 124-29 supra and accompanying text.
226. 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965), reversed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4572 (U.S. June 20, 1966).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964).
228. 347 F.2d 679, 684. See note 157 supra. Defendants in Peacock also advanced two
other claims. They argued that § 1443(2) supported removal under the first and fourteenth
amendments, a contention rejected both by the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals. 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4572, 4573. They also argued that § 1443(1) dictated removal
when defendants could not obtain a fair trial in the state court in which their case was
pending, in accordance with a literal reading of the subsection, id. at 4577, a claim like-
wise ignored by the Circuit Court. 347 F.2d at 684.
229. 34 U.S.L. WEEK at 4579. The leading cases were Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1
(1906); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). In a companion case to Peacock, Georgia v.
Rachel, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4563, the Court unanimously opened the Rives-Powers barrier
just a crack. It allowed removal where sit-in demonstrators were arrested attempting to
enforce Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Court argued that the public ac-
commodations title of the Civil Rights Act was unique, in that its own provisions
authorized district court intervention to "substitute a right for a crime." 34 U.S.L. WrEK
at 4579. Thus, the Court in effect construed the removal statute, which is an express
grant of federal jurisdiction, in pari materia with the anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (1964), a withdrawal of jurisdiction. Even conceding arguendo that tills analogy
was valid, Mr. Justice Douglas in dissent found that § 11(b) (the Kates proviso) of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 authorized direct intervention as plainly as did § 203 of the
1964 Act. Id. at 4584.
230. Charges levelled at the defendants involved in the Peacock appeal included as.
sault and battery, interfering with an officer, illegal operation of motor vehicles, contribut-
ing to the delinquency of a minor, parading without a permit, disturbing the peace, and
inciting a riot. See the dissenting opinion, 34 U.S.L. WEFK at 4580.
231. Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion trotted out the classic separate function maxim-
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exists in few states, least of all in the South. State judges are generally
the liegemen of local political establishments. When a dominant fac-
tion feels threatened enough to turn police harassment on its foes, most
state judges will find political pressure more compelling than federal
supremacy.2
32
The Court's antipathy to the Fifth Circuit's rule evidently stemmed
from fear of "wholesale dislocation" of state judicial responsibility.z2
But the rule-limited to harassment prosecutions-hardly affects an
essential part of state court business..2 34 It permits direct intervention
only where the normal remedy of Supreme Court review is inade-
quate.3 5 More important, judicial remedies like removal do not touch
on the substantial concerns of opponents of direct intervention. They
put us no closer to the day when the cop on the beat takes his orders
from J. Edgar Hoover; they can not destroy the administrative bases
of state political power.236
Affirming the Fifth Circuit would not have shifted power to in-
truders from Washington. On the contrary, federal district and appeals
judges are drawn from local leadership groups; their careers, while
generally more distinguished, have not diverged widely from those
of state judges and public officials.237 But life tenure allows federal
comity requires that the good faith of state officials be presumed but never actually
scrutinized:
The civil rights removal statute does not require and does not permit the judges
of the federal courts to put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial.
34 U.S.L. VFEr at 4578. Compare Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion for the Court in Harrison
v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), discussed in notes 39-40 supra and accompanying text.
The Court went on to intimate that federal supervision would stunt the growth of re-
spect for federal supremacy among Southern state judges, a claim rather difficult to
down. 34 U.S.L. 'W.EK at 4580.
232. Only a failure to compare Madisonian federalism theory with present-day politi-
cal realities can lead to reification of the paper resemblance between the state and
federal governments-as Mr. Justice Douglas noted. Id. at 4580. See notes 78-79 supra
and accompanying text.
233. Id. at 4579.
234. Removal has not in fact been widely abused by defense lawyers, as Mr. Justice
Stewart seems tadtly to fear. It has operated almost without exception in genuine civil
rights cases, and at that almost exclusively in those areas of the deep South where
harassment is prevalent.
235. See note 34 supra and accompanying text. Other remedies for civil rights viola-
tions mentioned by the Court, 34 U.S.L. WAEr at 4578, are not the answer to sham
prosecutions. Immediate release is the proper remedy, not Supreme Court reversal three
or four years in the future, and not the uncertain, cumbersome, and likely dispropor-
tionate sanction of federal criminal or civil liability.
236. See text following note 47 supra.
237. The career of Mr. Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's Peacoc! opinion, pro-
vides an ironic example. After a distinguished sojourn in the public life of his home-
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judges to bring a national perspective to the problems of their juris-
diction. They are, in brief, uniquely fitted to integrate federal policy
with regional mores, to soften resistance to the demands of federal
law.238 With its renewed ban on direct intervention, the Court has
senselessly disarmed the Southern federal bench.
town, Cincinnati, Ohio, Stewart graduated to a place on the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. As an appellate judge, he would have been ideally equipped to play a
significant supervisory role, had Cincinnati encountered problems like those of present-
day Mississippi and Alabama.
238. Consider the tone of Judge Wisdom's dissent in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227
F. Supp. 556, 569-71 (ED. La. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 479 (1965):
The Court declined to act on the constitutional issues the case presents and re-
fused the plaintiffs an opportunity to offer evidence in proof of their case. . .. To
me, the majority's decision appears to rest on a sort of visceral feeling that somehow,
if relief were granted, the Court would be impinging on States' Rights.
0 * *
"States' Rights" are mystical, emotion-laden words. For me, as for most Southerners,
the words evoke visions of the hearth and defense of the homeland and carry the
sound of bugles and the beat of drums. But the crowning glory of American federal-
ism is not states' Rights. It is the protection the United States Constitution gives
to the private citizen against all wrongful governmental invasion of fundamental
rights and freedoms.
When the wrongful invasion comes from the State, and especially when the un-
lawful state action is locally popular or when there is local disapproval of the
requirements of federal law, federal courts must expect to bear the primary re-
sponsibility for protecting the individual. This responsibility is not new. It did not
start with the School Segregation Cases. It is close to the heart of the American
Federal Union. It is implicit in the replacement of the Articles of Confederation by
the Constitution. It makes federalism workable.
Joining Judge Wisdom as leaders of the effort to bring the Constitution to the deep
South have been Judges Rives, Brown, and Chief Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit and
Judges Sobeloff and Bell of the Fourth Circuit. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 154 and 157
supra.
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